Le siège de Paris par les Normands, en 885 et 886 / poème d'Abbon ; avec la trad. en regard, accompagné de notes explicatives et historiques, par N. R. Taranne,...

[Bella Parisiacae urbis (français-latin). 1834]

BAFF-R, a newly identified TNF receptor that specifically interacts with BAFF.

B cell homeostasis has been shown to critically depend on BAFF, the B cell activation factor from the tumor necrosis factor (TNF) family. Although BAFF is already known to bind two receptors, BCMA and TACI, we have identified a third receptor for BAFF that we have termed BAFF-R. BAFF-R binding appears to be highly specific for BAFF, suggesting a unique role for this ligand-receptor interaction. Consistent with this, the BAFF-R locus is disrupted in A/WySnJ mice, which display a B cell phenotype qualitatively similar to that of the BAFF-deficient mice. Thus, BAFF-R appears to be the principal receptor for BAFF-mediated mature B cell survival.

Computation of multiple correspondence analysis, with code in R

The generalization of simple correspondence analysis, for two categorical variables, to multiple correspondence analysis where they may be three or more variables, is not straighforward, both from a mathematical and computational point of view. In this paper we detail the exact computational steps involved in performing a multiple correspondence analysis, including the special aspects of adjusting the principal inertias to correct the percentages of inertia, supplementary points and subset analysis. Furthermore, we give the algorithm for joint correspondence analysis where the cross-tabulations of all unique pairs of variables are analysed jointly. The code in the R language for every step of the computations is given, as well as the results of each computation.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Pääministeri R. v. Fieandt 15/3 1958

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