When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

Social equality in the number of choice options is represented in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

A distinct aspect of the sense of fairness in humans is that we care not only about equality in material rewards but also about equality in non-material values. One such value is the opportunity to choose freely among many options, often regarded as a fundamental right to economic freedom. In modern developed societies, equal opportunities in work, living, and lifestyle are enforced by anti-discrimination laws. Despite the widespread endorsement of equal opportunity, no studies have explored how people assign value to it. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural substrates for subjective valuation of equality in choice opportunity. Participants performed a two-person choice task in which the number of choices available was varied across trials independently of choice outcomes. By using this procedure, we manipulated the degree of equality in choice opportunity between players and dissociated it from the value of reward outcomes and their equality. We found that activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree to which the number of options between the two players was equal. In contrast, activation in the ventral striatum tracked the number of options available to participants themselves but not the equality between players. Our results demonstrate that the vmPFC, a key brain region previously implicated in the processing of social values, is also involved in valuation of equality in choice opportunity between individuals. These findings may provide valuable insight into the human ability to value equal opportunity, a characteristic long emphasized in politics, economics, and philosophy.

Project Pró-Natal: population-based study of perinatal and infant mortality in Natal, Northeast Brazil

RAMOS, Ana Maria de Oliveira et al. Project Pró-Natal: population-based study of perinatal and infant mortality in Natal, Northeast Brazil. Pediatric and Developmental Pathology, v.3, n.1, p.29-35, 2000

Public-private partnerships for innovation and export development: the Irish model of development

Includes Bibliography

Address by Honourable Basil Ince Minister of External Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago at the inaugural ceremony of the CDCC Seventh Session, Monday 24 January 1983

Discurso del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Trinidad y Tabago en el cual destaca la labor del CDCC como instrumento de los paises del Caribe para articular sus necesidades e intreses y coordinar sus relaciones y actividades para la cooperacion regional.

A qualidade de vida de dependentes de álcool

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Qualidade de vida em portadores de paralisia cerebral: associação com nível funcional e aspectos sócio-demográficos

Pós-graduação em Saúde Coletiva - FMB

Avaliação da qualidade de vida dos pacientes submetidos a artroplastia total primária do quadril antes e após a cirurgia

Pós-graduação em Saúde Coletiva - FMB

Variation of Environmental Regulation Stringency Among the Top Ten U.S. Hog Producing States

The U.S. hog industry, once primarily made up of small owner-operated crop-hog farms, has become dominated by large specialized operations characterized by low costs and improved technologies in livestock management. Such changes have triggered concerns over the dangers large Hog Feeding Operations (HFOs) are likely to pose to the environment. In 2007, the top ten states accounted for more than 85 percent of total U.S. hog production (Iowa (IA), North Carolina (NC), Minnesota (MN), Illinois (IL), Nebraska (NE), Indiana (IN), Missouri (MO), Oklahoma (OK), Ohio (OH), and Kansas (KS)). With such domination on production, these states are often the subject of environmental debate relating to hog production. When farmers are required to incorporate environmental measures in hog production, their costs of production increase. Metcalfe (2001) found that small HFOs have found it difficult to cope with such costs and many have exited the industry, while large operations have not been affected at the same level. Due to the variation of environmental regulations among states, other operations moved to states with lax regulations (e.g. NC prior to the late 1990s). Such regulations appear to have played a major role in shaping the structure of the hog industry.

Optimism of Rural Nebraskans

Results from the 2008 Nebraska Rural Poll showed rural Nebraskans were more optimistic about their lives than they have been in previous years. More Nebraskans believed they were better off than they were five years ago, and more were optimistic about their futures. They had reason to be optimistic last year, the agricultural economy in 2007 was strong, especially for crop producers. The poll was taken between March and May, 2008, before the national economy began to falter in October. Thus the 2009 Nebraska Rural Poll will help clarify how rural Nebraskans are responding to the current economic times.