The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.

Design of an indirectly fired gas turbine integrated with an organic rankine cycle unit for combined heat and power production

In the last years, the European countries have paid increasing attention to renewable sources and greenhouse emissions. The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament have established ambitious targets for the next years. In this scenario, biomass plays a prominent role since its life cycle produces a zero net carbon dioxide emission. Additionally, biomass can ensure plant operation continuity thanks to its availability and storage ability. Several conventional systems running on biomass are available at the moment. Most of them are performant either in the large-scale or in the small power range. The absence of an efficient system on the small-middle scale inspired this thesis project. The object is an innovative plant based on a wet indirectly fired gas turbine (WIFGT) integrated with an organic Rankine cycle (ORC) unit for combined heat and power production. The WIFGT is a performant system in the small-middle power range; the ORC cycle is capable of giving value to low-temperature heat sources. Their integration is investigated in this thesis with the aim of carrying out a preliminary design of the components. The targeted plant output is around 200 kW in order not to need a wide cultivation area and to avoid biomass shipping. Existing in-house simulation tools are used: They are adapted to this purpose. Firstly the WIFGT + ORC model is built; Zero-dimensional models of heat exchangers, compressor, turbines, furnace, dryer and pump are used. Different fluids are selected but toluene and benzene turn out to be the most suitable. In the indirectly fired gas turbine a pressure ratio around 4 leads to the highest efficiency. From the thermodynamic analysis the system shows an electric efficiency of 38%, outdoing other conventional plants in the same power range. The combined plant is designed to recover thermal energy: Water is used as coolant in the condenser. It is heated from 60°C up to 90°C, ensuring the possibility of space heating. Mono-dimensional models are used to design the heat exchange equipment. Different types of heat exchangers are chosen depending on the working temperature. A finned-plate heat exchanger is selected for the WIFGT heat transfer equipment due to the high temperature, oxidizing and corrosive environment. A once-through boiler with finned tubes is chosen to vaporize the organic fluid in the ORC. A plate heat exchanger is chosen for the condenser and recuperator. A quasi-monodimensional model for single-stage axial turbine is implemented to design both the WIFGT and the ORC turbine. The system simulation after the components design shows an electric efficiency around 34% with a decrease by 10% compared to the zero-dimensional analysis. The work exhibits the system potentiality compared to the existing plants from both technical and economic point of view.

Governing the Local: Sovereignty, Social Governance and Community Safety

There has been much commentary about the re-ordering of the relations between nation state government, geographical territory, and populations in the advanced liberal democracies. This is seen as a product of: increasing demographic and cultural diversity due to legal and illegal migration; economic, cultural, and political global interdependence; footloose mobility of capital and the outsourcing of jobs to poorer countries; the growing power of international corporations and financial markets; and the growth of supra-national bodies like the European Union and The North Atlantic Free Trade Association, the World Trade Organisation, and (debatably), the UN. These developments are held to be associated with the gradual demise of the model of the increasingly secular nation state first crystallised by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This conception provided a mutual, guarantee of states’ jurisdiction over territory and populations through their legitimated attempts to monopolise the use of force. Though, the relations between these states have always been asymmetrical and often challenged (Hunter 1998).

Towards End-User Driven Power Saving Control in Android devices

Abstract. During the last decade mobile communications increasingly became part of people's daily routine. Such usage raises new challenges regarding devices' battery lifetime management when using most popular wireless access technologies, such as IEEE 802.11. This paper investigates the energy/delay trade-off of using an end-user driven power saving approach, when compared with the standard IEEE 802.11 power saving algorithms. The assessment was conducted in a real testbed using an Android mobile phone and high-precision energy measurement hardware. The results show clear energy benefits of employing user-driven power saving techniques, when compared with other standard approaches.

Market Access in Switzerland and in the European Union for Agricultural Products from Least Developed Countries

The introduction of the so-called “duty free quota free” treatment (DFQF) for all products from least developed countries (LDCs), in particular by the European Communities (EC) and by Switzerland, raised expectations of increased agricultural exports for these 49 countries. Despite the high tariff differential LDCs now enjoy over their competitors, especially for agricultural products and particularly in Switzerland, the results until 2007 are dismal: with the exception of sugar exports to the EC, LDCs have not been able to substantially increase their agricultural exports to Europe. This study analyses the result-ing tariff situation and the remaining non-tariff barriers. In many instances it is not cus-toms duties but the sanitary and phytosanitary barriers which turn out to be the single most important hurdle preventing trade. For instance, almost no LDC-based company can supply animal-based products. Similarly, certain private standards set by proces-sors and retailers prevent imports, particularly from LDCs, far more effectively than tar-iffs. Several gateways into this “European cordon sanitaire” are proposed. Only if offered in the context of a package of various carefully coordinated measures, DFQF could yet have a real impact on trade from LDCs. As it stands, this treatment constitutes only a nice-to-have but still largely ineffective instrument of trade development.

The Jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization 2014

In 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adopted seven panel reports and six Appellate Body rulings. Two of the cases relate to anti-dumping measures. Three cases, comprising five complaints, are of particular interest and these are summarized and discussed below. China – Rare Earths further refines the relationship between protocols of accession and the general provisions of WTO agreements, in particular the exceptions of Article XX GATT. Recourse to that provision is no longer excluded but depends on a careful case-by-case analysis. While China failed to comply with the conditions for export restrictions, the case reiterates the problem of insufficiently developed disciplines on export restrictions on strategic minerals and other commodities in WTO law. EC – Seals Products is a landmark case for two reasons. Firstly, it limits the application of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) resulting henceforth in a narrow reading of technical regulations. Normative rules prescribing conditions for importation are to be dealt with under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) instead. Secondly, the ruling permits recourse to public morals in justifying import restrictions essentially on the basis of process and production methods (PPMs). Meanwhile, the more detailed implications for extraterritorial application of such rules and for the concept of PPMs remain open as these key issues were not raised by the parties to the case. Peru – Agricultural Products adds to the interpretation of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), but most importantly, it confirms the existing segregation of WTO law and the law of free trade agreements. The case is of particular importance for Switzerland in its relations with the European Union (EU). The case raises, but does not fully answer, the question whether in a bilateral agreement, Switzerland or the EU can, as a matter of WTO law, lawfully waive their right of lodging complaints against each other under WTO law within the scope of their bilateral agreement, for example the Agreement on Agriculture where such a clause exists.

The World Trade Organization - Law, Practice and Policy, 3rd edition

The WTO is one of the most important intergovernmental organizations in the world, yet the way in which it functions as an organization and the scope of its authority and power are still poorly understood. This comprehensively revised new edition of the acclaimed work by an outstanding team of WTO law specialists provides a complete overview of the law and practice of the WTO.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture

To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Measuring citizens' implicit and explicit attitudes towards the European Union

Studies assessing citizens’ attitudes towards Europe have mostly used explicit concepts and measures. However, psychologists have shown that human behaviour is not only determined by explicit attitudes which can be assessed via self-report, but also by implicit attitudes which require indirect measurement. We combine a self-report questionnaire with an implicit Affective Misattribution Procedure for the first time in an online environment to estimate the reliability, validity and predictive power of this implicit measure for the explanation of European Union-skeptical behaviour. Based on a survey with a sample representative for Germany, we found evidence for good reliability and validity of the implicit measure. In addition, the implicit attitude had a significant incremental impact beyond explicit attitudes on citizens’ proneness to engage in EU-skeptical information and voting behaviour.

An Assessment of the Case for Monetary Union or Official Dollarization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela

We use a data set covering the whole period of Argentina's currency board and most of that spanned by the Mercosur trade agreement to examine the case for either a Latin American monetary union or monetary union with the USA (through official dollarization). Our econometric evidence using VAR techniques indicates that macroeconomic shocks are still so highly asymmetric in Latin America and between Latin American countries and the USA as to make monetary union or official dollarization somewhat doubtful policies.

Gobierno provincial, empresarios y CGT frente a la apertura del juego corporativo durante el primer peronismo : Santa Fe, 1952-1955

Este artículo describe los conflictos suscitados durante el primer peronismo entre el Poder Ejecutivo de Santa Fe, la Federación Económica que agrupó a los empresarios del distrito y los diputados sindicales pertenecientes a la CGT a causa de la inclusión de la mencionada Federación en la gestión de gobierno. Tales conflictos se desarrollaron en un proceso de creciente corporativización de la política. Se reconstruyen brevemente dos movimientos paralelos que fomentaron dicha corporativización: la agremiación de los empresarios radicados en la provincia, quienes lograron conformar una central única; y la acción de los diputados sindicales dentro de la Cámara Legislativa provincial

Gobierno provincial, empresarios y CGT frente a la apertura del juego corporativo durante el primer peronismo : Santa Fe, 1952-1955

Este artículo describe los conflictos suscitados durante el primer peronismo entre el Poder Ejecutivo de Santa Fe, la Federación Económica que agrupó a los empresarios del distrito y los diputados sindicales pertenecientes a la CGT a causa de la inclusión de la mencionada Federación en la gestión de gobierno. Tales conflictos se desarrollaron en un proceso de creciente corporativización de la política. Se reconstruyen brevemente dos movimientos paralelos que fomentaron dicha corporativización: la agremiación de los empresarios radicados en la provincia, quienes lograron conformar una central única; y la acción de los diputados sindicales dentro de la Cámara Legislativa provincial

Gobierno provincial, empresarios y CGT frente a la apertura del juego corporativo durante el primer peronismo : Santa Fe, 1952-1955

Este artículo describe los conflictos suscitados durante el primer peronismo entre el Poder Ejecutivo de Santa Fe, la Federación Económica que agrupó a los empresarios del distrito y los diputados sindicales pertenecientes a la CGT a causa de la inclusión de la mencionada Federación en la gestión de gobierno. Tales conflictos se desarrollaron en un proceso de creciente corporativización de la política. Se reconstruyen brevemente dos movimientos paralelos que fomentaron dicha corporativización: la agremiación de los empresarios radicados en la provincia, quienes lograron conformar una central única; y la acción de los diputados sindicales dentro de la Cámara Legislativa provincial

Trade and Business Cycle Correlations in Asia-Pacific

Recent empirical studies challenge the traditional theory of optimum currency areas by arguing that a monetary union enhances trade and business cycle co-movements among its member countries sufficiently as to obviate the need for national monetary policy. This paper examines the empirical relationship between trade and business cycle correlations among thirteen Asia-Pacific countries, paying particular attention to the structural characteristics of their economies and other issues not explored fully in the literature. According to our result, although trade is relevant to the business cycles of individual countries, the main determinant of their international correlations is not the geographical structure of their trade but what they produce and export --more specifically the extent to which their output and exports are concentrated on electronic products.