The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Fostering economic policy coordination in Latin America: the REDIMA approach to escaping the prisoner's dilemma

Includes bibliography

E-commerce environment and trade promotion for Latin America: policy implications from East Asian and advanced economies' experiences

Includes bibliography

Theory and practice of industrial policy: evidence from the Latin American experience

Includes bibliography

Monetary dilemmas: Argentina in MERCOSUR

Includes bibliography

Regional integration and the issue of choosing an appropriate exchange-rate regime in Latin America

Includes bibliography

Social dimensions of macroeconomic policy: report of the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations

Introduction The social agenda is long-term in nature, in the sense that poverty alleviation along with a better distribution of income, wealth and opportunities are long-term goals. A sound macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, has to do largely with the consistent management of short-term policy instruments pursuing a sustainable and predictable pace for aggregate economic variables and major prices (wages, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates). In spite of the different arena and rationale in which they play, there are strong links between the two. First and most obvious, macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform are more likely to be sustainable when they are equitable. Second, social intervention —i.e., policies, programmes and reforms aimed at improving social performance in the long run—, needs stable funding which is not always available in view of macroeconomic constraints. Third, macroeconomic instability —especially episodes of recession or hyperinflation— increases poverty and inequality, while restoring macroeconomic equilibrium does not restore previous social balances. Finally, there is no unique macroeconomic policy mix to tackle a given situation, and the policy options may not be neutral from a social standpoint. Monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies, together with structural reform, have major consequences for the social wellbeing of societies, not only in terms of protection against shocks and crises but also in terms of equity. Many, if not all, of the necessary social policies are of a domestic nature. This report thus concentrates on domestic strategies aimed at maximizing the linkages between consistent macroeconomic policies and social progress. Pursuing them, however, depends to a considerable extent on the international enabling environment in which the global financial system, the unsettled debt crisis and increasing ODA flows play a significant role. Countries operate in a world economy where market players everywhere immediately scrutinize domestic monetary, financial or fiscal policy decisions and the performance of exchange rate regimes of individual countries. Under these conditions, the room for manoeuvre of policymakers has become considerably constrained. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly complex to incorporate the social dimensions into such policy decisions, to the extent that external analysts consider that authorities are sacrificing sound macroeconomic policies. The main message of the report is that the expediency of short-term economic efficiency as embedded in much of the advice on macroeconomic stability needs to be tempered by long-term development objectives. The report starts with a short historical background which describes the ascendancy of macroeconomic policies over social development policies (chapter I). It continues with an evaluation of the relation between macroeconomic consistency and social effort (chapter II), and the importance of sustainable and stable growth for social progress (chapter III). The report then turns to the need for an equity-enhancing growth strategy (chapter IV) and an analysis of the priorities of social policies in an integrated approach to growth (chapter V). The final chapter adds some final institutional remarks.

Financial crisis and national policy issues: an overview

Includes bibliography

How optimal are the extremes?: Latin American exchange rate policies during the Asian crisis

Includes bibliography

The monetary crisis, dollarization and the exchange rate

Includes bibliography

Capital flows and their effect on the monetary base

Includes bibliography

Globalization and loss of autonomy by the fiscal, banking and monetary authorities

Includes bibliography

The Central Bank and Chilean macroeconomic policy in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

Neoliberal reforms and macroeconomic policy in Peru

Includes bibliography