Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China

In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.

Influence of Social Institutions on Inequality in China

This study analyses the impact of changes in social institutions, i.e. in the informal and formal social security system, on income inequality in China. This study uses an inequality decomposition analysis approach comparing household survey data for 1988 with 1995.Three main results emerge from the analysis: first, it findsthat the family based social security is losing its importance mainly through the changes in employment pattern in a household. This change contributes to rising income inequality. Second, thestudy shows that the introduction of new formal social security system helped to equalise the distribution of retired household members' income in urban areas in 1995. Third, however, these changes have only benefited a restricted number of persons. Benefits for rural migrants are low and most of the rural population has still no access to the new system.

Financial Aspects of Transactions with FDI: Trade Credit Provision by SMEs in China

This paper will document financial aspects of transactions, and trade credit supply behavior with FDI among small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) based on two original surveys, conducted in four cities in China in 2003. The survey was designed to capture the nature of inter-firm transactions, trade credit and other financial conditions. Literature on FDI mainly refers to technology transfer, employment or investment. This paper focuses on the role and significance of FDI in the supply of trade credit due to its trade credit enforcement technology. Yanagawa, Ito and Watanabe [2006] developed a model which indicates that when a seller has higher enforcement technology or a buyer has richer liquidity, both trade credit and transaction volume will be increased. In this paper, we confirmed that FDI and G contributed to the provision of trade credit and had a positive external effect on trade credit enforcement towards China’s economy. (1) Sales towards FDI customers have the power to increase the trade credit ratio,even when controlling other factors such as choice of payment instrument, competitiveness, and expost default management. This implies that FDI does provide trade credit, not only because it has superior liquidity, but because it is also superior in terms of enforcement of trade credit repayment.(2) Cash constraints of the buyer influence the decisions concerning trade credit provided by the seller, as a model in Yanagawa, et al. [2006] predicted, and this implies that strategic default is a serious concern among SMEs in China. (3) Spillover effect exists in payment enforcement technology in transactions with FDI customers.

The Flowchart Model of Cluster Policy: The Automobile Industry Cluster in China

This paper proposes a general model of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy and applies this model to Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. The flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an action plan for prioritizing policy measures in a time-ordered series. We reached the following two conclusions. First,we clarified the effects of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota on agglomeration in Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. Second, we established that local governments play a crucial role in successful industrial cluster policy, and that the mayor of the local government should be offered incentives in order to target industrial clustering and implement cluster policy.

A Divergent Path of Industrial Upgrading: Emergence and Evolution of the Mobile Handset Industry in China

Starting from almost null in the late 1990s, China's mobile phone handset industry has grown to account for more than 40 percent of the current world production. While export growth has been overwhelmingly led by multi-national corporations (MNCs), increasingly fierce competition in the domestic market ignited by the advent of local handset makers has induced unique industrial evolution: (1) outgrowth of independent design houses specialized in handset development and (2) emergence of IC fabless ventures that design core ICs for handsets. In the background of this evolutionary industrial growth there are factors such as, the scale and increasing diversity of China's domestic market that advantages local firms vis-a-vis MNCs; modularization of handset and semiconductor technologies; policy interventions that supports local startups. The emergence and evolution of China's handset industry is likely to have international implications as the growth of the global demand for low-cost and multi-function mobile phone handsets is expected to accelerate. Thus, our case suggests that the conventional view of latecomer industrialization and upgrading that emphasizes the key role of international production networks organized by MNCs needs to be modified in order to accommodate China's rise into perspective.

Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.