Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.

Reproductive cooperation between queens and their mated workers: the complex life history of an ant with a valuable nest.

The life history of Harpegnathos saltator is exceptional among ants because both queens and workers reproduce sexually. Recently mated queens start new colonies alone, but later some of the offspring workers also become inseminated and take over the egg-laying role. This alternation seems associated with the existence of very complex underground nests, which are designed to survive floods. Longevity of ponerine queens is low (a consequence of limited caste dimorphism in this "primitive" subfamily), and upon the death of an H. saltator foundress, the nest represents a substantial investment. The queen's progeny should thus be strongly selected to retain the valuable nests. Unlike the flying queens, the workers copulate with males from their own colonies, and, thus, their offspring are expected to be highly related to the foundress. Colony fission appears not to occur because a daughter fragment would lack an adequate nest for protection. Thus, the annual production of queens in colonies with reproductive workers remains essential for the establishment of new colonies. This contrasts with various other ponerine species in which the queens no longer exist.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.

La cooperación triangular: los donantes tradicionales ante la cooperación Sur-Sur

La cooperación triangular constituye una modalidad novedosa con relevantes potencialidades para el sistema internacional de ayuda y para la cooperación española. Además de constituirse como un instrumento mediante el que impulsar la cooperación Sur-Sur, de creciente interés en la nueva arquitectura de la ayuda, le otorga a la cooperación española claras oportunidades para dar contenido práctico a la agenda con los países de renta media y, específicamente, con América Latina. Conocedora de estas implicaciones, España inició su andadura en esta modalidad de ayuda en 2005, con una actividad centrada en los países latinoamericanos. Sin embargo, no existen estudios que analicen estas intervenciones y sus implicaciones. Esto es lo que motivó un estudio promovido por la Fundación Carolina sobre dos experiencias concretas de cooperación triangular. El presente artículo presenta las principales enseñanzas extraídas de ese análisis sobre el terreno, al tiempo que recoge algunas orientaciones que puedan ser de utilidad para la práctica futura en este ámbito.

A public key cryptosystem based on block upper triangular matrices

We propose a public key cryptosystem based on block upper triangular matrices. This system is a variant of the Discrete Logarithm Problem with elements in a finite group, capable of increasing the difficulty of the problem while maintaining the key size. We also propose a key exchange protocol that guarantees that both parties share a secret element of this group and a digital signature scheme that provides data authenticity and integrity.