The EU-Turkey Customs Union: A model for Future Euro-Med Integration. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 9/March 2012

This paper studying the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union (CU) reveals that the CU has been a major instrument of integration of the Turkish economy into the EU and global markets, offering powerful tools to reform the Turkish economy. Turkish producers of industrial goods are protected by tariffs from external competition to exactly the same extent as EU producers, and they face competition from duty-free imports of industrial goods from world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish industrial producers have duty-free market access to the European Economic Area, which was recently extended to certain Mediterranean countries. Trade liberalisation achieved through the CU has thus successfully moved the Turkish economy from a government-controlled regime to a market-based one, and Turkish producers of industrial goods have performed remarkably well. The paper further shows that market access conditions for Turkish producers are determined, in addition to tariffs, by standards, conformity assessment procedures, competition policy, industrial property rights and contingent protectionism measures. The CU also offered Turkey the opportunity to establish new institutions, and modernise and upgrade rules and disciplines required for the elimination of technical barriers to trade, and for the implementation of the EU’s competition, industrial property rights, and contingent protectionism policies.

Europe’s energy security – is the Energy Union the answer? EPC Commentary

From the Introduction. The EU has seen a renewed interest in strengthening its common energy policy and promoting energy security. The greatest trigger has been Russia’s unpredictable, aggressive behaviour in Ukraine in the past year. Lack of trust in a long-standing economic partner and concerns about relying on a trade partner that does not adhere to international norms have left their mark.

The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.

The Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2013

This paper seeks to delineate some preliminary factors and working methods that could work in favour of establishing a workable international export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies. Drawing on the work initiated by various United Nations initiatives and the Wassenaar Agreement, but specifically looking at the European Union export regime model, this working paper asks if and how a similar model could be adopted at the international level. Far from suggesting that the EU regime should of could be adopted on a global basis or that the regime is full-proof, the authors acknowledge that EU regulations are seen as among the most stringent of frameworks on dual-use goods and technologies available. Accordingly, this paper asks what elements of the EU’s control regime could be of international benefit after the ATT negotiations and how it could be adopted on a more international basis. Indeed, any future ATT control mechanism for dual-use items will have to draw on existing arms transfers and control regimes. It does this through an analysis of the ATT and the current discourse on dual-use goods and technologies in the negotiations, an stocktaking of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s export control regime and by asking what elements of the EU’s regime could be utilised for international control mechanisms after a future ATT is negotiated.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

Analyser l’influence du syndicalisme agricole majoritaire: quelle utilité pour le modèle néo-corporatiste? Etude de cas à partir du «mini-paquet lait» = Analyze the influence of the majority agricultural trade unionism: what use to the neo-corporatist model? Case study from the "mini-milk package". Bruges Political Research Paper No. 35, August 2014

Cette recherche se propose de réfléchir sur la place des groupes d’intérêts dans le système politique de l’UE en partant de l’exemple de la filière lait. Dans un système généralement pluraliste, la PAC fait en effet figure de cas particulier puisqu’elle a fonctionné à partir des années 1960 sur une logique de co-gestion de la politique des marchés entre la Commission et la principale fédération agricole européenne, le Comité des Organisations Professionnelles agricoles (COPA) associé depuis 1962 au Comité Général de la Coopération agricole de l'Union européenne (COGECA). Néanmoins, du fait du processus de réforme de la PAC engagé depuis 1992, il paraît nécessaire d’analyser si la logique de co-gestion est remise en cause. Cette recherche conclue qu’il existe bien un rapport néo-corporatiste dans le secteur laitier, dans le sens où un acteur en particulier, le syndicat COPA-COGECA est parvenu à influencer de manière déterminante la procédure en obtenant de renforcer le pouvoir de négociation des producteurs sans revenir sur les réformes récentes de la PAC.

The Role of the European Union in the World. European Policy Brief No. 22, March 2014

Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Enhancing the Prospects of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas in the Mediterranean: Lessons from the Eastern Partnership. CEPS Commentary, 24 June 2015

In their March 2015 Consultation paper on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission and the High Representative raised the question whether the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) “are the right objective for all or should more tailor-made alternatives be developed, to reflect differing interests and ambitions of some partners?” Such ambitious but complex trade agreements have now finally been signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but they are still on the table for several Mediterranean ENP countries. Although these Mediterranean partners have a completely different political, economic and legal relationship with the EU, some important lessons can be drawn from the ‘Eastern DCFTA experience’. In particular, the DCFTA negotiators should avoid overly ambitious and ill-defined legislative approximation commitments and develop a comprehensive implementation strategy.

Basic Statistics for Fifteen European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fourth Edition. November 1963

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1952-62; supplementary statistics in an social field-employment, earnings, expenditure, social security

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fifth Edition. November 1964

Population; labour force; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; social statistics; standar5d of living; trends of major economic indicators in the countries of the community; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1956-63

Consensus, contradiction, and conciliation of interests: the geo-economics of the Energy Union. EPC Policy Brief, 8 July 2015

European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.

Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive areas, ranging from food safety and public procurement to economic and regulatory assessments of technical barriers to trade, automotive, chemicals, energy, services, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms and regulatory cooperation. Their insights cut through the confusion and tremendous public controversies now swirling around TTIP, and help decision-makers understand how the United States and the European Union can remain rule-makers rather than rule-takers in a globalising world in which their relative influence is waning.