Chronotype and time-of-day effects on mood during school day

Existing evidence suggests an association between mood, time-of-day and Morningness-Eveningness (M-E). Since few studies have been carried out among adolescents, in this study daily mood fluctuations were analyzed in the naturalistic school context during two days in order to test how chronotype and time-of-day are related to mood during the school schedule period and check if sleep length is involved in the above relation. A sample of 655 adolescents (12-16 years) reported mood levels (current level of pleasantness) three times during school day (8:10-8:30 h, 10:20-11:40 h, 13:50-14:10 h). They also reported M-E preference and time in bed. Neither age nor sex was related to mood. However, the results indicated that regardless of chronotype mood increased throughout the school day from the lowest morning levels. Moreover, morning types showed better mood compared to other chronotypes, while evening types exhibited the lowest mood. Evening oriented students slept less than other chronotypes, but time in bed was not involved in the relationship between chronotype and mood. These results suggest that it is not shortened sleep duration responsible for decreased mood in evening oriented students.

Auto-atribuciones académicas: diferencias de género y curso en estudiantes de educación secundaria

El análisis de las autoatribuciones académicas constituye un aspecto esencial del componente afectivo y emocional de la motivación escolar en estudiantes de educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO). El objetivo de este estudio fue analizar, mediante un diseño transversal, las diferencias de género y curso y el papel predictivo de estas variables en las atribuciones causales académicas de los alumnos medidas a través de las escalas generales de la Sydney Attribution Scale (SAS). El cuestionario fue administrado a 2.022 estudiantes (51.08% chicos) de 1º a 4º de ESO. El rango de edad fue de 12 a 16 años (M = 13.81; DT = 1.35). Los resultados derivados de los análisis de varianza y de los tamaños del efecto (índice d) revelaron que los chicos atribuyeron sus éxitos significativamente más a su capacidad, mientras las chicas los atribuyeron significativamente más al esfuerzo. Respecto a las atribuciones de fracaso escolar, los resultados indicaron que los chicos los atribuyeron significativamente más a la falta de esfuerzo que las chicas. Asimismo, se hallaron diferencias de curso académico en la mayoría de las atribuciones causales analizadas. Los análisis de regresión logística indicaron que el género y el curso fueron predictores significativos de las atribuciones causales académicas, aunque los resultados variaron para cada una de las escalas de la SAS. Los resultados son discutidos en relación a la necesidad de diseñar programas de intervención que tengan en cuenta las variables sexo y curso académico.

Política de la República Federal de Alemania hacia España durante el franquismo y la transición (1949-1979)

En este artículo se realiza un análisis de la evolución de la política que la República Federal de Alemania (RFA) desarrolló hacia España durante las tres décadas que separan la creación del joven Estado federal y la entrada en vigor de la Constitución Española. Sin tratar de abarcar todos y cada uno de los asuntos que la caracterizaron, se pretende estudiar la conformación de los grandes vectores que la articularon y su paulatina transformación, en sintonía con la evolución internacional y la de ambos países.

The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin's privileged position in the eurozone. OSW Commentary No. 123, 10.01.2014

On 18 December 2013, EU finance ministers reached agreement on the structure of a banking union. The body will be tasked with oversight of the largest banks across the EU. It will also devise recovery and resolution programmes for institutions at risk of bankruptcy, and it will handle wind-up arrangements and decide on the allocation of resulting costs. The proposals are expected to be approved by March of this year by the governments of the eurozone states, by other EU members interested in joining the banking union, and by the European Parliament. A compromise on the supervision of the largest banks in the eurozone was reached several months ago. The most recent negotiations focused on the second pillar of the banking union: a Single Resolution Mechanism. The parties successfully negotiated a set of procedures for rescuing banks capable of recovery and for the closure of institutions that cannot be rescued. A joint position was also agreed on the allocation of costs resulting from such actions.

The German reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict- shock and disbelief. OSW Commentary No. 132, 03.04.2014

The crisis in Ukraine and the Russian intervention have brought about a situation in which it is necessary for Germany to make decisions and take action. No one in Berlin was prepared for this nor did anyone want this to occur. The effect of this is that the government has adopted a clearly critical stance on Russia, albeit in tandem with cautious diplomatic moves; it has given its consent to limited sanctions on representatives of the Russian elite, and has disapproved of economic sanctions. On the other hand, voices have been heard in the political debate in Germany not only warning of the catastrophic consequences of a deterioration in German-Russian relations but also those in fact expressing understanding for the Russian reaction. Although it is typical above all of the business circles engaged in Russia and the authors of Germany’s Ostpolitik to downplay the Kremlin’s moves, political parties and the German public are divided over how Germany should respond to Moscow’s policy, and this dispute will worsen. Berlin will take a whole array of actions to de-escalate the conflict, since the imposition of radical political and economic sanctions on Russia would also have a strong adverse effect on Germany. As regards sanctions, Germany would not only sustain economic losses, but they would also undermine the ideological foundations for the still popular vision for Germany’s strategy towards Russia in which great emphasis is laid on a strong “respect for the EU’s most important neighbour and its interests”.

Germany's energy transformation: difficult beginnings. OSW Report, March 2013

Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.

Chasing globalisation: Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries. OSW Report, November 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%. The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts. The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

The expensive energy revolution in Germany. The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule. OSW Commentary No. 77, 2012-05-10

One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses renewable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely difficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German government will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively support the financing of both the development of the energy networks in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources in the energy sector.