Dealing with bad guys: actor- and process-level determinants of the “devil shift” in policy making

Policy actors tend to misinterpret and distrust opponents in policy processes. This phenomenon, known as the “devil shift”, consists of the following two dimensions: actors perceive opponents as more powerful and as more evil than they really are. Analysing nine policy processes in Switzerland, this article highlights the drivers of the devil shift at two levels. On the actor level, interest groups, political parties and powerful actors suffer more from the devil shift than state actors and powerless actors. On the process level, the devil shift is stronger in policy processes dealing with socio-economic issues as compared with other issues. Finally, and in line with previous studies, there is less empirical evidence of the power dimension of the devil shift phenomenon than of its evilness dimension.

Daily negative affect and smoking after a self-set quit attempt: The role of dyadic invisible social support in a daily diary study

Objectives Social support receipt from one's partner is assumed to be beneficial for successful smoking cessation. However, support receipt can have costs. Recent research suggests that the most effective support is unnoticed by the receiver (i.e., invisible). Therefore, this study examined the association between everyday levels of dyadic invisible emotional and instrumental support, daily negative affect, and daily smoking after a self-set quit attempt in smoker–non-smoker couples. Methods Overall, 100 smokers (72.0% men, mean age M = 40.48, SD = 9.82) and their non-smoking partners completed electronic diaries from a self-set quit date on for 22 consecutive days, reporting daily invisible emotional and instrumental social support, daily negative affect, and daily smoking. Results Same-day multilevel analyses showed that at the between-person level, higher individual mean levels of invisible emotional and instrumental support were associated with less daily negative affect. In contrast to our assumption, more receipt of invisible emotional and instrumental support was related to more daily cigarettes smoked. Conclusions The findings are in line with previous results, indicating invisible support to have beneficial relations with affect. However, results emphasize the need for further prospective daily diary approaches for understanding the dynamics of invisible support on smoking cessation.

Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.