Addressee orientation in political speeches: tracing the dialogical 'other' in argumentative monologue

This article suggests that the addressees as the dialogical ‘other’ loom large in monological political speeches. However, political speeches are produced under conditions of addressee heterogeneity, i.e. the speakers do not actually know who they will be talking to. It will be argued that the addressees are nevertheless a crucial element in speakers’ context models, that speakers orientate towards imagined addressees and that certain aspects – what possible addressees may do, think or believe and that they are a part of an imagined community – are particularly relevant from the speakers’ point of view. An analysis of addressee orientation in political speeches aims at reconstructing speakers’ conceptualisations of possible addressees. The analysis reveals patterns of addressee orientation which suggest that the addressees are framed in terms of presumed nearness (i.e. agreement) or distance (i.e. disagreement) to the speakers. Both presumed agreement and disagreement will be discussed in terms of how the speakers aim to impose their default perspectives on the addressees. The analysis is based on examples from a substantial corpus of German chancellors’ political speeches from 1951-2001.

Human capital and growth under political uncertainty

In this paper we show how political uncertainty may impede economic growth by reducing public investment in the formation of human capital, and how this negative effect of political uncertainty can be offset by a government contract. We present a model of growth with accumulation of human capital and government investment in education. We show that in a country with an unstable political system the government is reluctant to invest in human capital. Low government spending on education negatively affects productivity and slows growth. Furthermore, a politically unstable economy may be trapped in a stagnant equilibrium. We also demonstrate the role of a government retirement contract. Public investment in education and economic growth are higher when the future retirement compensation of the government depends on the future national income, in comparison with investment under zero or fixed retirement compensation.

"You can see some eagles. And hear the trumpets": the literary and political hinterland of T.S. Eliot's 'Coriolan'

There has been an increased amount of scholarly interest lately in T.S. Eliot's unfinished sequence, Coriolan (1932)—interest drawn from its Shakespearian allusiveness, and from analysis of this writing's particularly rebarbative, jarring poetic. Although, however, the two parts of the sequence published by Eliot are acknowledged as being his nearest approach to poetic commentary upon contemporary political ideas, little criticism exists establishing the hinterland of the political thought, with which Eliot was most familiar, as editor of the Criterion. Coriolan emerges at a time when the lure of fascism pulled hardest at Eliot's sensibility. This article reviews the full political context provided by Eliot's journal, as well as considering the connections between that political engagement and the readings of Shakespeare he was also promulgating through this forum, in order to provide a more complex sense than hitherto of the diverse pressures underlying the unsettled nature of the existing Coriolan poems.

The political economy of state-building in Kosovo

The chapter examines the impact of international statbuilding efforts on political and economic dynamics in Kosovo from 1999 to 2011

Military competition and the emergence of nationalism: putting the logic of political survival into historical context

This essay aims to make a contribution to the conversation between IR and nationalism literatures by considering a particular question: What is the relationship between interstate military competition and the emergence of nationalism as a potent force in world politics? The conventional wisdom among international security scholars, especially neorealists, holds that nationalism can be more or less treated like a “technology” that allowed states to extract significant resources as well as manpower from their respective populations. This paper underlines some of the problems involved with this perspective and pushes forward an interpretation that is based on the logic of political survival. I argue that nationalism’s emergence as a powerful force in world politics followed from the “mutation” and absorption of the universalistic/cosmopolitan republican ideas that gained temporary primacy in Europe during the eighteenth century into particularistic nationalist ideologies. This transformation, in turn, can be best explained by the French Revolution’s dramatic impacts on rulers’ political survival calculi vis-à-vis both interstate and domestic political challenges. The analysis offered in this essay contributes to our understanding of the relationship between IR and nationalism while also highlighting the potential value of the political survival framework for exploring macrohistorical puzzles.

Unwritten law in Hobbesian political thought

In Hobbesian terminology, ‘unwritten laws’ are natural laws enforced within a polity, by a non-sovereign judge, without some previous public promulgation. This article discusses the idea in the light of successive Hobbesian accounts of ‘law’ and ‘obligation’. Between De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes dropped the idea that natural law is strictly speaking law, but he continued to believe unwritten laws must form a part of any legal system. He was unable to explain how such a law could claim a legal status. His loyalty to the notion, in spite of all the trouble that it caused, is a sign of his belief that moral knowledge is readily accessible to all.

Waltz and the world: neorealism as international political theory?

The recent recovery of an empirically and ethically richer realist tradition involves an explicit contrast with neorealism's more scientistic explanatory aspirations. This contrast is, however, incomplete. Although Waltz's theoretical work is shaped by his understanding of the requirements of scientific adequacy, his empirical essays are normatively quite rich: he defends bipolarity, and criticizes US adventurism overseas, because he believes bipolarity to be conducive to effective great power management of the international system, and hence to the avoidance of nuclear war. He is, in this sense, a theorist divided against himself: much of his oeuvre exhibits precisely the kind of pragmatic sensibility that is typically identified as distinguishing realism from neorealism. His legacy for a reoriented realism is therefore more complex than is usually realized. Indeed, the nature of Waltz's own analytical endeavour points towards a kind of international political theory in which explanatory and normative questions are intertwined.

Terrorism and cabinet duration

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970–2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

International terrorism, domestic political instability, and the escalation effect

What are the main causes of international terrorism? Despite the meticulous examination of various candidate explanations, existing estimates still diverge in sign, size, and significance. This article puts forward a novel explanation and supporting evidence. We argue that domestic political instability provides the learning environment needed to successfully execute international terror attacks. Using a yearly panel of 123 countries over 1973–2003, we find that the occurrence of civil wars increases fatalities and the number of international terrorist acts by 45%. These results hold for alternative indicators of political instability, estimators, subsamples, subperiods, and accounting for competing explanations.