810 resultados para Managerial Reform
Resumo:
Before 1982 Mexico's welfare state regime was a limited conservative one that put priority on the social security of organized labor. But following the country's debt crisis in 1982, this regime changed to a hybrid liberal model. The Ernest Zedillo government (1995-2000) in particular pushed ahead with liberal reform of the social security system. This paper examines the characteristics and the policy making of the social security reforms in the 1990s. The results suggest that underlying these reforms was the restructuring of the economy and the need to cope with the cost of this restructuring. The paper also points out that one of the main factors making possible the rapid execution of the reforms were the weakened political clout of the officialist labor unions due to their steady breakdown during the 1990s and the increase in the monopolistic power of the state vis-a-vis the position of labor during the negotiations on social security reforms.
Resumo:
Beginning after World War II, Argentina institutionalized a limited conservative corporatist welfare state where occupation-linked social insurance held a central position and social assistance had a residual character. This was called a limited conservative corporatist welfare state, because the huge population within the informal sector was excluded from the main system. A populist government supported by trade unions and the economic model of import-substituting industrialization were the background for the formation of this type of welfare state. During the 1990s, elements of a liberal regime were added to the Argentine welfare state under the reform carried out by the Menem Peronist government. However, social insurance reform and labor reform were not as drastic as the economic reform. They still retained a certain continuity from the traditional systems. The government intended to carry out more drastic social security and labor reform, but was unable to do so due to the legacy of corporatism of the Peronist government.
Resumo:
This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.
Resumo:
This paper examines social sector expenditures in fifteen Indian states between 1980/81 and 1999/2000 to find out whether the far-reaching economic reforms that began in 1991 had any significant impact on the level and trend of these expenditures; and if there was any such impact, what were the reasons behind the ensuing changes. The empirical analysis in this study shows that revenue became a major determinant of social sector expenditures from the mid 1980s with the result that real per capita social sector expenditures in most states started to decline even before the economic reforms began as states' fiscal deficits worsened in the 1980s. Economic reforms, therefore, largely did not have a major negative impact on expenditures. In fact there was a positive impact on some states, which often were those that received more foreign aid than other states. By the late 1990s, states expending more on the social sector changed from states with a traditionally strong commitment to the social sector, such as Kerala, to states having higher revenues including aid from outside the country.
Resumo:
After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector reform program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices. The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession management system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to plywood industries were reduced during 1998-2003. The rents were not collected properly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the black market for round wood.
Resumo:
This paper tries to understand the current status of South African labor market, which is changing in contradictory directions, i.e. a strengthening of the rights and protection of workers at the same time as the flexibilization of employment, in the context of the characteristics of labor and social security legislation in South Africa, as well as the nature of labor and social security reforms after democratization. We put emphasis on the corporatist nature of labor policy-making as the factor influencing the course of reforms; it is argued that the apparently contradictive changes can be explained consistently by the corporatist labor policy-making process which has been practiced notwithstanding the problem of representativeness.
Resumo:
This paper will analyze the Menem administration's social policy reforms during the 1990s. Neo-liberal reforms in Argentina are well-known both in the economy and in the social arena, but in the latter we can discern the presence of tripartite negotiations. The form of such negotiations, the type of agreements reached as a result, and the background to those agreements will be discussed. We also pay attention to the concept of competitive corporatism, which was established under the increase in market competition brought about by globalization.
Resumo:
Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.
Resumo:
Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.
Resumo:
In the five-year period from 2006 to 2011, the real exchange rate of the Myanmar kyat appreciated 200 percent, signifying that the value of the US dollar in Myanmar diminished to one third of its previous level. While the resource boom is suspected as a source of the real exchange rate appreciation, its aggravation is related to administrative controls on foreign exchange and imports. First, foreign exchange controls prevented replacement of the negotiated transactions of foreign exchange with the bank intermediation. This hampered government interventions in the market. Second, import controls repressed imports, aggravating excess supply of foreign exchange. Relaxation of administrative controls is necessary for moderating currency appreciation.
Resumo:
Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of President Kibaki on the evening of 30 December 2007, Kenya was thrust into the worst civil unrest experienced by the country since independence – a development that became known as the "Post-Election Violence" (PEV). However, after a subsequent process of reconciliation, the PEV came to an end within a relatively short period. The present-day politics of Kenya are being conducted within the framework of a provisional Constitution that took shape through peaceful mediation. How did Kenya manage to put a lid on a period of turmoil that placed the country in unprecedented danger? This paper traces the sequence of events that led to mediation, explains the emergency measures that were needed to maintain law and order, and indicates the remaining problems that still need to be solved.