840 resultados para Local government
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Hearings held Sept. 30, 1957-Jan. 28, 1958 in various cities.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Sabin 10390; Staton and Tremaine, no. 1638.
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Burton K. Wheeler, chairman.
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Description based on pt. 1.
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This research focuses on two groups of local companies; namely, high-growth local companies and other local companies, to examine and compare the influence of utilising governmental initiatives, servicing foreign MNCs and internationalisation on their strategic planning process. The theme of this thesis argues that the approach of an organisation towards strategic planning is not only determined by the internal influences; namely, its firm size and the planning behaviour and attitude of an entrepreneur, as revealed in the literature, but it can also be affected by external influences. The theoretical contribution of this research determines this unique situation in Singapore, and tests the robustness of the conventional models of planning in smaller companies. As a result of the external influences, this study reveals that local companies are more likely to undertake a much more formal strategic planning than the conventional Western literature and models would indicate. High-growth local companies, in comparison, however, had undertaken a more formal and rigorous strategic planning process than other local companies.
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These case studies from CIMA highlight the need to embed risk management within more easily understood behaviours, consistent with the overall organisational culture. In each case, some form of internal audit team provides either an oversight function or acts as an expert link in that feedback loop. Frontline staff, managers and specialists should be completely aligned on risk, in part just to ensure that there is a consistency of approach. They should understand instinctively that good performance includes good risk management. Tesco has continued to thrive during the recession and remains a robust and efficient group of businesses despite the emergence of potential threats around consumer spending and the supply chain. RBS, by contrast, has suffered catastrophic and very public failures of risk management despite a large in-house function and stiff regulation of risk controls. Birmingham City Council, like all local authorities, is adapting to more commercial modes of operation and is facing diverse threats and opportunities emerging as a result of social change. And DCMS, like many other public sector organisations, has to handle an incredibly complex network of delivery partners within the context of a relatively recent overhaul of central government risk management processes. Key Findings: •Risk management is no longer solely a financial discipline, nor is it simply a concern for the internal control function. •Where organisations retain a discrete risk management cadre – often specialists at monitoring and evaluating a range of risks – their success is dependent on embedding risk awareness in the wider culture of the enterprise. •Risk management is most successful when it is explicitly linked to operational performance. •Clear leadership, specific goals, excellent influencing skills and open-mindedness to potential threats and opportunities are essential for effective risk management. •Bureaucratic processes and systems can hamper good risk management – either as a result of a ‘box-ticking mentality’ or because managers and staff believe they do not need to consider risk themselves.
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This paper contributes to the literature in nancial aid and authoritarian institutions.
For a long time, scholars are debating whether nancial aid is able to facilitate
development and governance. Though abundant evidence is provided, the answer is
still inconclusive. On the other hand, scholars investigating China argue that the
leadership uses various institutions to ensure local ocials' compliance. In this paper,
we nd that the nancial aid does not bring a positive impact and the central
government in China does not have enough monitoring capacity to force local o-
cials to comply. We study a redevelopment program established by Chinese central
government after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. By adopting a geographic regression
discontinuity combining with a dierence-in-dierences design, we show that
the redevelopment program does not signicantly develop the disaster area. On the
contrary, the evidence implies that the economy in the disaster area is worse after
receiving the aid. The results imply that local ocials do not follow the central government's
regulations and misuse the aid money for other purposes. In the future, we
expect to further investigate through which mechanism do local ocials undermine
the existing institutions.
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