821 resultados para Legal certainty
Resumo:
Global legal pluralism is concerned, inter alia, with the growing multiplicity of normative legal orders and the ways in which these different orders intersect and are accommodated with one another. The different means used for accommodation will have a critical bearing on how individuals fare within them. This article examines the recent environmental jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to explore some of the means of reaching an accommodation between national legal orders and the European Convention. Certain types of accommodation – such as the margin of appreciation given to states by the Court – are well known. In essence, such mechanisms of legal pluralism raise a presumptive barrier which generally works for the state and against the individual rights-bearer. However, the principal focus of the current article is on a less well-known, recent set of pluralistic devices employed by the Court, which typically operate presumptively in the other direction, in favour of the individual. First, the Court looks to instances of breaches of domestic environmental law (albeit not in isolation); and second, it places an emphasis on whether domestic courts have ruled against the relevant activity. Where domestic standards have been breached or national courts have ruled against the state, then, presumptive weight is typically shifted towards the individual.
Changing subjects: rights, remedies and responsibilities of individuals under global legal pluralism
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Analysis of the decision in Richardson v Midland Heart Ltd (formally Focus Homes Options) [2008] L&TR 31
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Several previously unnoticed texts concerning ancient lawcourts can be found in the Colloquia of the Hermeneumata Pseudodositheana, a set of bilingual dialogues composed for language learners during the Roman empire. The texts describe court cases, both criminal and civil; their writers probably taught in law schools between the second and fourth centuries ad. Editions, translations, and summary information about these texts are provided.
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This book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.
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This article explores the role of women's inheritance and ownership of property in urban Senegal. It shows how being able to inherit and own property promotes the economic and emotional security of widows and their children in urban areas, and discusses the challenges posed by legal pluralism in working on poverty alleviation and social protection in the city.
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Drawing on the research I undertook into the life of Gwyneth Bebb, who in 1913 challenged the Law Society of England and Wales for their refusal to admit women to the solicitors’ profession, this article focuses on the range of sources one might use to explore the lives of women in law, about whom there might be a few public records but little else, and on the ways in which sources, even official ones, might be imaginatively used. It traces the research process from the case that inspired the research (Bebb v The Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286) through to the creation of an entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and what this means for women’s history, emphasising the importance of asking the ‘woman question’ and seeking out the broader significance of a woman’s life in the context of her times.