Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.

Shared knowledge

Agents use their knowledge on the history of the economy in orderto choose what is the optimal action to take at any given moment of time,but each individual observes history with some noise. This paper showsthat the amount of information available on the past evolution of theeconomy is an endogenous variable, and that this leads to overconcentrationof the investment, which can be interpreted as underinvestment in research.It presents a model in which agents have to invest at each period in one of$K$ sectors, each of them paying an exogenous return that follows a welldefined stochastic path. At any moment of time each agent receives an unbiasednoisy signal on the payoff of each sector. The signals differ across agents,but all of them have the same variance, which depends on the aggregate investmentin that particular sector (so that if almost everybody invests in it theperceptions of everybody will be very accurate, but if almost nobody doesthe perceptions of everybody will be very noisy). The degree of hetereogeneityacross agents is then an endogenous variable, evolving across time determining,and being determined by, the amount of information disclosed.As long as both the level of social interaction and the underlying precisionof the observations are relatively large agents behave in a very preciseway. This behavior is unmodified for a huge range of informational parameters,and it is characterized by an excessive concentration of the investment ina few sectors. Additionally the model shows that generalized improvements in thequality of the information that each agent gets may lead to a worse outcomefor all the agents due to the overconcentration of the investment that thisproduces.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.

Regional growth in Japan

I study the role of internal migration in income convergence acrossregions in Japan. Neoclassical theory predicts that migration should have beenan important source of convergence. Regression results, however, suggest thatmigration did not contribute to convergence. I investigate the possibilitythat this discrepancy is explained by taking into account the effects ofmigration on population composition, especially on educational attainment.I propose an empirical approach to quantify this ``educational compositioneffect''. It is shown that, although this effect did slow down convergence,its magnitude was too small to account for the discrepancy between theoryand empirics.

Bowling for fascism: Social capital and the rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33

Social capital a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially "dark side" of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party's triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations veteran associations and non-military clubs, "bridging" and "bonding" associations positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.