Restructuring Justice: Moving Towards Gender-Responsive Programming and Alternatives to Incarceration for Non-Violent Female Offenders

The United States¿ Federal and State laws differentiate between acceptable (or, legal) and unacceptable (illegal) behavior by prescribing restrictive punishment to citizens and/or groups that violate these established rules. These regulations are written to treat every person equally and to fairly serve justice; furthermore, the sanctions placed on offenders seek to reform illegal behavior through limitations on freedoms and rehabilitative programs. Despite the effort to treat all offenders fairly regardless of social identity categories (e.g., sex, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, ability, and gender and sexual orientation) and to humanely eliminate illegal behavior, the American penal system perpetuates de facto discrimination against a multitude of peoples. Furthermore, soaring recidivism rates caused by unsuccessful re-entry of incarcerated offenders puts economic stress on Federal and State budgets. For these reasons, offenders, policy-makers, and law-abiding citizens should all have a vested interest in reforming the prison system. This thesis focuses on the failure of the United States corrections system to adequately address the gender-specific needs of non-violent female offenders. Several factors contribute to the gender-specific discrimination that women experience in the criminal justice system: 1) Trends in female criminality that skew women¿s crime towards drug-related crimes, prostitution, and property offenses; 2) Mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes that are disproportionate to the crime committed; 3) So-called ¿gender-neutral¿ educational, vocational, substance abuse, and mental health programming that intends to equally rehabilitate men and women, but in fact favors men; and 4) The isolating nature of prison structures that inhibits smooth re-entry into society. I argue that a shift in the placement and treatment of non-violent female offenders is necessary for effective rehabilitation and for reducing recidivism rates. The first component of this shift is the design and implementation of gender- responsive treatment (GRT) rather than gender-neutral approaches in rehabilitative programming. The second shift is the utilization of alternatives to incarceration, which provide both more humane treatment of offenders and smoother reintegration to society. Drawing on recent scholarship, information from prison advocacy organizations, and research with men in an alternative program, I provide a critical analysis of current policies and alternative programs, and suggest several proposals for future gender- responsive programs in prisons and in place of incarceration. I argue that the expansion of gender-responsive programming and alternatives to incarceration respond to the marginalization of female offenders, address concerns about the financial sustainability of the United States criminal justice system, and tackle high recidivism rates.

The anatomical and cellular basis of immune surveillance in the central nervous system

The central nervous system (CNS) comprises the brain, spinal cord, optic nerves and retina, and contains post-mitotic, delicate cells. As the rigid coverings of the CNS render swelling dangerous and destructive, inflammatory reactions must be carefully controlled in CNS tissues. Nevertheless, effector immune responses that protect the host during CNS infection still occur in the CNS. Here, we describe the anatomical and cellular basis of immune surveillance in the CNS, and explain how this shapes the unique immunology of these tissues. The Review focuses principally on insights gained from the study of autoimmune responses in the CNS and to a lesser extent on models of infectious disease. Furthermore, we propose a new model to explain how antigen-specific T cell responses occur in the CNS.

Preparing Offspring for a Dangerous World: Potential Costs of Being Wrong

Adaptive maternal responses to stressful environments before young are born can follow two non-exclusive pathways: either the mother reduces current investment in favor of future investment, or influences offspring growth and development in order to fit offspring phenotype to the stressful environment. Inducing such developmental cues, however, may be risky if the environment changes meanwhile, resulting in maladapted offspring. Here we test the effects of a predator-induced maternal effect in a predator-free postnatal environment. We manipulated perceived predation-risk for breeding female great tits by exposing them to stuffed models of either a predatory bird or a non-predatory control. Offspring were raised either in an environment matching the maternal one by exchanging whole broods within a maternal treatment group, or in a mismatching environment by exchanging broods among the maternal treatments. Offspring growth depended on the matching of the two environments. While for offspring originating from control treated mothers environmental mismatch did not significantly change growth, offspring of mothers under increased perceived predation risk grew faster and larger in matching conditions. Offspring of predator treated mothers fledged about one day later when growing under mismatching conditions. This suggests costs paid by the offspring if mothers predict environmental conditions wrongly.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Child Aggression in a Post-Communist Country: Race and Gender Aspects in a Cross-Cultural Comparison

Gypsies represent approximately 2.5% of the Czech population, but are considerably over-represented among the unemployed, prisoners, schooldropouts, neglected children, etc. Together with racist attitudes on the part of the majority, this causes strong inter-ethnic tension and obviouseconomic, moral and political problems. This research studied the way in which this situation is reflected in peer relations between Gypsy andmajority children in schools. Six samples of children (totalling 2974 children aged 7-15, of whom 15% were Gypsies) were studied through peernomination, teacher assessment and self-reporting. Gypsy/non-Gypsy and gender dichotomies were correlated with measures of aggression,victimisation and acceptance/rejection. The results showed that Gypsy children, both boys and girls, were more likely to nominate their Gypsy peers as aggressors than they nominatemajority children, implying that they tend to direct their rejection toward their own kind. The number of Gypsy children in a class was also animportant factor with Gypsies being more likely to be accepted and less likely to appear aggressive when they were only one or two in a class, thanin a class where there was a greater number of Gypsy pupils. When whole classes were taken as the unit of analysis, Gypsy children were seen asmore likely to behave aggressively in class by their Gypsy and non-Gypsy counterparts as well as by their teachers. At the same time they aremuch less likely to become victims of aggression than are non-Gypsy children, both boys and girls. Mr. Rican also found that the acceptance/rejection patterns of Gypsy children betray their unsatisfactory socialisation. Among their peers, Gypsyor non-Gypsy, they tend to prefer aggressors or children who teachers describe as showing little discipline or effort to succeed at school. Partialcorrelation to assess the influence of seniority on aggressiveness provided a warning that the recent lengthening of compulsory school attendance islikely to bring an increase in aggressiveness. He believes that Gypsy ethnic identity has lost many of its important positive aspects, making itsnegative aspects more prominent and more dangerous. He does however find some possible ways for teachers to reinforce the positive aspects ofGypsy children's identities in order to support their socialisation at schools.

Family Anomie and Juvenile Deliquency in Post-Communist Romania

The sensitivity of crime rates to social, economic and political influences has long aroused the interest of sociologists who have attempted to explain what kind of relationships might be associated with variations in crime rates between different social groups at different times. The earliest views were put forward by Emil Durkheim, and while later writers have developed (R.K. Merton, L. Srole, A, K. Cohen, etc.) have developed some aspects of his ideas further, his basic ideas of the divorce of the individual from normative standards and the lack of social integration are still valid. Ms. Voicu-Minea looked at the theoretical background in detail but then limited it to a specific social group, the family, asking first why certain individual within vulnerable families and/or negative social influences commit offences while others do not. In modern times the family has undergone massive structural and functional changes. Its former economic function, which once endowed it with a great capacity for social inclusion, has generally vanished, while its formerly crucial role in children's education has been massively reduced. These changes, which are still not complete, can lead to dysfunction and in certain social contexts such as that in post-communist Romanian society, this risk of dysfunction is still greater as unfavourably social circumstances more easily affect such families. The number of cases of juvenile delinquency in Romania has increased sharply ever since the end of the communist system and in 1996 reached the level of 18,317 cases. The sample examined included 1012 juvenile delinquents aged between 14 and 18, taken from all areas of Bucharest. Over 80% of charges related to theft, with more serious offences being relatively rare. The children underwent a series of psychological tests, accompanied by a questionnaire relating to family situation. The results showed that juvenile delinquency in Romania is overwhelmingly male, with 91.8% of offences being committed by boys. Two thirds of the research group were under the age of 16 and only just over one third attended school, with over half having left school before the legal age. While the majority of subjects had a lower than average level of education, they did not always recognise this, with two thirds seeing their level of education as being as good as or better than average. Nearly half the children (43%) did not live with both natural parents and majority came from families with three or more children. This applied both to their original families and to the families in which they were living at the time of the survey. The overwhelming majority of families were living in or around Bucharest, but under one third originated from there. Almost 25% of parents were under-schooled and around one third were unqualified workers. At least 30% of families lived in inadequate accommodation and family incomes were generally low. Ms. Voicu-Minea does however point out that over half the minors from the sample saw their family income as satisfactory or even more than satisfactory. When factors such as bad relationships between parents, corporal punishment, alcohol consumption and criminal records of family members were taken into account, the picture was bleak, making it understandable why over 36% of subjects had run away from home at least once, and in many cases repeatedly and for longer periods. The overwhelming majority of offences (80.8%) were committed in groups of between 2 and 11 persons, usually "friends" but in about 10% of cases member's of the family. IQ tests put about 75% of the sample at slightly under average, the difference being too slight to account for the behaviour problems of the majority. Personality tests, however, showed a different picture. Over 70% of those tested manifested an acute need of tenderness and a similar number a high level of potential aggressiveness. Almost half of the minors expressed such feelings as intolerance or a desire for revenge, and Ms. Voicu-Minea found a clear weakness of the Self. Around half the sample expressed sentiments of abandonment, renunciation and solitude.

Are full or empty beer bottles sturdier and does their fracture-threshold suffice to break the human skull?

Beer bottles are often used in physical disputes. If the bottles break, they may give rise to sharp trauma. However, if the bottles remain intact, they may cause blunt injuries. In order to investigate whether full or empty standard half-litre beer bottles are sturdier and if the necessary breaking energy surpasses the minimum fracture-threshold of the human skull, we tested the fracture properties of such beer bottles in a drop-tower. Full bottles broke at 30 J impact energy, empty bottles at 40 J. These breaking energies surpass the minimum fracture-threshold of the human neurocranium. Beer bottles may therefore fracture the human skull and therefore serve as dangerous instruments in a physical dispute.

XIAP discriminates between type I and type II FAS-induced apoptosis

FAS (also called APO-1 and CD95) and its physiological ligand, FASL, regulate apoptosis of unwanted or dangerous cells, functioning as a guardian against autoimmunity and cancer development. Distinct cell types differ in the mechanisms by which the 'death receptor' FAS triggers their apoptosis. In type I cells, such as lymphocytes, activation of 'effector caspases' by FAS-induced activation of caspase-8 suffices for cell killing, whereas in type II cells, including hepatocytes and pancreatic beta-cells, caspase cascade amplification through caspase-8-mediated activation of the pro-apoptotic BCL-2 family member BID (BH3 interacting domain death agonist) is essential. Here we show that loss of XIAP (X-chromosome linked inhibitor of apoptosis protein) function by gene targeting or treatment with a second mitochondria-derived activator of caspases (SMAC, also called DIABLO; direct IAP-binding protein with low pI) mimetic drug in mice rendered hepatocytes and beta-cells independent of BID for FAS-induced apoptosis. These results show that XIAP is the critical discriminator between type I and type II apoptosis signalling and suggest that IAP inhibitors should be used with caution in cancer patients with underlying liver conditions.

Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining Spatial Variation in Lethal Criminal Violence: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of Homicide within the United States

One of the most influential statements in the anomie theory tradition has been Merton’s argument that the volume of instrumental property crime should be higher where there is a greater imbalance between the degree of commitment to monetary success goals and the degree of commitment to legitimate means of pursing such goals. Contemporary anomie theories stimulated by Merton’s perspective, most notably Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory, have expanded the scope conditions by emphasizing lethal criminal violence as an outcome to which anomie theory is highly relevant, and virtually all contemporary empirical studies have focused on applying the perspective to explaining spatial variation in homicide rates. In the present paper, we argue that current explications of Merton’s theory and IAT have not adequately conveyed the relevance of the core features of the anomie perspective to lethal violence. We propose an expanded anomie model in which an unbalanced pecuniary value system – the core causal variable in Merton’s theory and IAT – translates into higher levels of homicide primarily in indirect ways by increasing levels of firearm prevalence, drug market activity, and property crime, and by enhancing the degree to which these factors stimulate lethal outcomes. Using aggregate-level data collected during the mid-to-late 1970s for a sample of relatively large social aggregates within the U.S., we find a significant effect on homicide rates of an interaction term reflecting high levels of commitment to monetary success goals and low levels of commitment to legitimate means. Virtually all of this effect is accounted for by higher levels of property crime and drug market activity that occur in areas with an unbalanced pecuniary value system. Our analysis also reveals that property crime is more apt to lead to homicide under conditions of high levels of structural disadvantage. These and other findings underscore the potential value of elaborating the anomie perspective to explicitly account for lethal violence.

Guest Editorial: Racial and Ethnic Conflict and Violence

Racial and ethnic violence takes many forms. Genocides, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, civil wars, and violent separatist movements are the most obvious and extreme expressions, but less organized violence such as rioting, and hate crimes by individuals or small groups are products of racial and ethnic conflict as well. Also, the distribution of criminal violence within societies, which may or may not be aimed at members of another group, is in some places a by-product of ongoing conflicts between superior and subordinated racial or ethnic groups. Although estimates of the number of deaths attributable to ethnic violence vary widely, range of eleven to twenty million given for the period between 1945 and the early 1990s show the gravity of this type of conflict (Williams 1994, 50). So it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid increasing attention to such conflicts over the last decades.

The role of mundane mobility and contact in dialect death and dialect birth

Urry begins his 2007 book, Mobilities, by throwing some quite stunning statistics at his readers: in 2010, there were one billion legal international arrivals at ports and airports; in 1800 people in the US travelled on average 50 metres per day, today it is 50 kilometres per day; 8.7% of world employment is in tourism; and, at any one time, there are 360,000 passengers in flight above the United States (2007: 3-4). But very many of these mobilities for the individuals concerned are or have become rather unexceptional – a flight to a holiday in Majorca or Florida, a journey on a crowded commuter train into Madrid or Tokyo, a cross-Channel ferry to Calais in France to pick up some cheap wine and a camembert. Whilst much of the theoretically influential dialectological literature on mobility reports on long-distance, often permanent, often dangerous migrations, I turn our attention here to the dialectological consequences of this unexceptional everyday movement. I will argue here that, just as more dramatic and long-distance mobilities can trigger linguistic change, so too can the much more mundane movements we engage in in everyday life. I demonstrate that the linguistic consequences of that contact are similar if not the same – perhaps less dramatic, perhaps involving the convergence of an initially less divergent array of variants – but typologically of the same ilk. And I demonstrate that because these mobilities have been long-term, intensive and ongoing, their consequences on the dialect landscape have been highly significant. Important to remember, however, is that these mobilities are socially stratified and unevenly distributed. As Wolff put it: “the suggestion of free and equal mobility is … a deception, since we don’t all have the same access to the road” (1993: 253).