926 resultados para Concepts scientifiques
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The extractive industry, more than any other sector of the economy, often finds itself mired in conflicts with various environmental and community interests. As traditional legal avenues of resolution gave way to the collaborative ideas of alternative dispute resolution, the outcomes, especially the relational outcomes, were less than desirable. This capstone project proposes that an Anticipatory Cooperative Effort (ACE) can help to bridge the gap between industry and environmental interests by encouraging a pro-active and pre-emptive engagement. The point of the ACE concept is not that it defines a new set of principles so much as it repositions where established ADR principles are entertained.
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The aim of this study is to characterise students’ understanding of the function-derivative relationship when learning economic concepts. To this end, we use a fuzzy metric (Chang 1968) to identify the development of economic concept understanding that is defined by the function-derivative relationship. The results indicate that the understanding of these economic concepts is linked to students’ capacity to perform conversions and treatments between the algebraic and graphic registers of the function-derivative relationship when extracting the economic meaning of concavity/convexity in graphs of functions using the second derivative.
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v. 2 (1851)
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Tome 3
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Tome 4
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Tome 2
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1854
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Tome 1
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[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8
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Le concept de gène est central en biologie. Certains ont avancé (Ruse (1971, 1976)) que la génétique classique pouvait être réduite à la génétique moléculaire. Dans le même ordre d'idée, Richard Dawkins, dans The Extended Phenotype, offre une double définition de son concept de gène qui présuppose qu'il soit possible d'opérer cette réduction. Nous comptons montrer que la génétique moléculaire et la génétique des populations ont chacune leurs problématiques propres en reconstituant l'histoire de la génétique depuis Darwin. Ensuite, nous expliciterons la position de Dawkins et soulignerons les contradictions auxquelles il parvient en raison de cette réduction infondée. À la suite de quoi, nous nous attarderons aux nouvelles découvertes moléculaires qui montrent qu'il n'est pas possible d'opérer la réduction d'un des concepts à l'autre. Nous terminerons en soulignant que la thèse génocentriste de Dawkins n'est pas mise en péril par l'abandon de la réduction, mais qu'il est nécessaire de tempérer ces prétentions. La conclusion globale de ce mémoire est qu'il est possible d'admettre le concept de Dawkins, mais pas la manière dont il l'utilise. Le concept est bon, il n'est tout simplement pas dans le bon cadre théorique.