The globalization of angel investments. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/09, 1 September 2015

The last decade has seen a rapid expansion and deepening of the types of vehicles that fund start-up firms in the U.S. and worldwide. In particular, we have seen a growing role of angel groups and other more “individualistic” funding options for start-ups, such as super angels or crowd sourcing platforms. Authors seek to understand the nature and consequences of angel investments across a variety of geographies with varying levels of venture capital markets and other forms of risk capital. They ask whether angel investors improve the outcomes and performance of the start-ups they invest in. Furthermore we want to understand whether and how the types of firms that seek angel funding vary with the overall entrepreneurial ecosystem in a country. Authors examine the records of 13 angel investment groups based in 12 nations and with applicants for financing transactions from 21 nations, examining both the applicants that were considered and rejected and those that were funded. Key findings from the analysis are two-fold. First, angel investors have a positive impact on the growth of the firms they fund, their performance, and survival. Second, they find that the selection of firms that apply for angel funding is different across countries.

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP) 35/2015.

This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.

Innovations of the European Central Bank in the Context of Financial and Monetary Integration: A Chinese Assessment. ZEI Discussion Paper C229, 2015

In the 15 years since the introduction of the Euro, the integration process within the European Economic and Monetary Union has seen rapid development in terms of both breadth and depth. Exclusively responsible for the monetary policy of the Eurozone, the European Central Bank has continued to adjust to meet the challenges brought about by these changes. The paper explores financial and monetary integration in the Eurozone and reviews the reasons, specific performance and impact of changes in the European Central Bank’s decision-making mechanisms. The purpose of which is to deepen and expand understanding in academic circles of the European economy and the European Economic and Monetary Union, as well as their development trends.

Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.