Définition d'un état zero et mise en place d'un système de suivi écologique permanent de l'arboretum de la station forestière de Mandraka

Mandraka possède de nombreux écosystèmes, dominés surtout par les forêts. Cette zone est située sur la première falaise orientale malgache et affiche des reliefs accidentés (pentes supérieures à 60%). Elle est exposée à un régime climatique à forte influence orientale se traduisant par une humidité permanente et un régime cyclonique fréquent. Les paramètres stationnels sont ainsi rudes, or ils sont écologiquement très importants car plusieurs caractéristiques physionomiques et comportementales des espèces forestières en dépendent. Cette étude s'intéresse à la station forestière de Mandraka, particulièrement à l'arboretum. Ce dernier fût créé dans les années cinquante et est actuellement géré par le Département des Eaux et Forêts. Ce site est actuellement à vocation pédagogique et écotouristique. Son état écologique est inconnu jusqu'à maintenant, et depuis sa création, aucun système n'a été mis en place pour mesurer et suivre sa viabilité. D'où, l'intitulé de ce travail de mémoire : « Définition d'un état zéro et mise en place d'un système de suivi écologique permanent de l'arboretum de la station forestière de Mandraka ». Les objectifs étant de collecter des données concernant l'état écologique actuel du site, d'identifier des indicateurs de suivi pour mesurer sa viabilité, et d'inclure un système de suivi écologique permanent dans une proposition de plan d'aménagement pour l'arboretum. Le suivi est en effet un outil très important pour l'analyse des ressources forestières. Il permet de cadrer toutes les interventions. Les diverses analyses menées lors de cette étude ont révélé une viabilité moyenne de l'arboretum. Cela est induit par une qualité de peuplement moyennement stable, une mortalité élevée (plus de 14%), et un potentiel d'avenir très faible, voire inexistant (taux de régénération à 0%). L'envahissement de la forêt artificielle par les espèces autochtones constitue la pression la plus importante de cet arboretum vu qu'il se trouve au milieu des forêts naturelles. L'analyse sylvicole effectuée sur les deux types dendrologiques révèle que les peuplements de conifères présentent des caractéristiques sylvicoles plus favorables que les feuillus. Ce niveau moyen de viabilité de l'arboretum implique ainsi la proposition d'un plan d'aménagement pour l'améliorer; le suivi est une activité primordiale, d'où la proposition d'un plan de suivi permanent pour l'arboretum. A noter que malgré la considération du critère de représentativité pour l'échantillonnage, toutes les questions ne pourront être répondues du fait que plusieurs mosaïques de peuplements artificiels de différentes espèces constituent l'arboretum, et que chacune de ces espèces plantées ont leurs propres caractéristiques. La mise en place des plots permanents d'observation ne servira ainsi que de référence (Etat zéro), mais on propose de prévoir un suivi intégral ainsi que diverses interventions pour l'arboretum en général. Ce travail constitue ainsi une base de données pour l'arboretum et pour la station forestière de Mandraka, mais il ne représente qu'une des facettes à prendre en considération dans une finalité d'amélioration de la viabilité. L'élaboration de cartes thématiques et d'évolution spatio-temporelle à l'issue de SIG (Système d'Information Géographique) permettra d'enrichir les informations établies et admettra un suivi plus précis.

"Montrer au linguiste ce qu'il fait". Une analyse épistémologique du structuralisme européen (Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Martinet, Benveniste) dans sa filiation saussurienne

Cette thèse consiste en une analyse épistémologique comparée et très détaillée de l’ensemble du corpus saussurien publié ainsi que d’une portion très significative des oeuvres de Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Martinet et Benveniste. Il s’agit de montrer qu’en dépit d’une filiation revendiquée le structuralisme européen n’est pas saussurien, et par là de faire apparaître, par contrecoup, la spécificité de la problématique saussurienne, ainsi que ses enjeux pour la linguistique et plus largement pour les sciences de l’humain. La problématique saussurienne avait permis, pour la première fois dans l’histoire de la linguistique, une appréhension théorique de la langue. La problématique structuraliste est en revanche entièrement empirique, de sorte que sa scientificité relève en réalité d’une idéologie scientifique, au sens de Georges Canguilhem. Le point nodal de cette radicale différence de problématique est l’absence de théorisation structuraliste du rapport son/sens, et corrélativement la mécompréhension du concept saussurien de système. Celui-ci devient alors structure, c’est-à-dire, comme nous tentons de le faire apparaître, appréhension structurale d’un objet dont la définition commune et évidente (celle de la langue comme instrument de communication) n’est pas remise en cause. A la problématique étiologique saussurienne, constitutive du concept de langue, répond ainsi une problématique analytique qui conduit quant à elle à la construction d’un objet (forme ou structure) en lieu et place d’un concept. Plus précisément, la problématique structuraliste est idiomologique. Elle manque ainsi la distinction entre langue et idiome dont nous tentons dès lors de démontrer la nécessité et le caractère constitutif de la théorisation de la langue et, au-delà, du langage, notamment dans le cadre d’une articulation entre linguistique et psychanalyse.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists