The EU and Syria – Time to Play behind Closed Doors. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue, September 13, 2013

From the Introduction. Since the – presumed – utilization of chemical weapons against civilians by the Assad regime late August, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community have been building the case for a military intervention, a punishing mission against Bashar al-Assad. Despite evidences that sarin gas was used, the UK and Germany seem to be out of the race – for a similar reason: domestic politics –, leaving the US and France in the starting blocks. French President Hollande has expressed his commitment to go to war. The world is now on hold waiting for the US as President Obama, after asking US Congress to postpone a vote on a military intervention, is working on a possible diplomatic solution with Russian President Putin. Since Kerry’s comments in London earlier this week, Russian President Putin has been seeking for a diplomatic solution that would put all Syrian chemical arsenals under international supervision.

Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe – A Defining Moment for the OSCE? CEPS Commentary, 24 April 2014

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the first and currently the only international body to have a monitoring mission deployed in Ukraine. This is as it should be, argues Erwan Fouéré. Today, with EU members making up half the membership of the OSCE, the EU needs to show greater responsibility and far-sightedness in its dealings with the OSCE. In the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, and faced with its most serious security crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU should take the lead once again in fostering collective responsibility on the part of all Participating States to ensure a meaningful and effective role for the OSCE.

The Case for EU Police Mission Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 14 May 2014

The EU appears to be out of its depth as a geopolitical actor trying to deal with the crisis in Ukraine. In this new CEPS Commentary, Steven Blockmans and Daniel Gros argue that the EU should concentrate on what really matters now: namely, preventing any further escalation of the conflict by sending a substantial stabilisation force to the areas that have so far remained relatively calm.

Ukraine and Security Disorder in Europe - A Defining Moment for the OSCE? CEPS Commentary, 24 April 2014

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the first and currently the only international body to have a monitoring mission deployed in Ukraine. This is as it should be, argues Erwan Fouéré. Today, with EU members making up half the membership of the OSCE, the EU needs to show greater responsibility and far-sightedness in its dealings with the OSCE. In the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, and faced with its most serious security crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU should take the lead once again in fostering collective responsibility on the part of all Participating States to ensure a meaningful and effective role for the OSCE.

Juncker’s Mission to the New Energy Team: Avoiding the hard choices. CEPS Commentary, 24 September 2014

In his mission letter to Arias Cañete, Jean-Claude Juncker asked the designated Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy to focus on further developing EU policy for renewables in order to “be a world leader in this sector” and on promoting the EU Emissions Trading System “to ensure that we reach our climate goals in a cost-effective way”. Furthermore, he would like Alenka Bratušek, the designated Vice-President for Energy Union, to focus on “completing the internal energy market” and on “increasing competition”. In assessing the feasibility and desirability of this remit, this commentary finds these objectives to be very ambitious but more importantly, partially conflicting, given the state of play in EU energy markets.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Do Too Many Chefs Really Spoil the Broth? The European Commission, Bureaucratic Politics and European Integration, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 09.2, 5 August 1999

There is a puzzling, little-remarked contradiction in scholarly views of the European Commission. On the one hand, the Commission is seen as the maestro of European integration, gently but persistently guiding both governments and firms toward Brussels. On the other hand, the Commission is portrayed as a headless bunch of bickering fiefdoms who can hardly be bothered by anything but their own in­ ternecine turf wars. The reason these very different views of the same institution have so seldom come into conflict is quite apparent: EU studies has a set of relatively autonomous and poorly integrated sub­ fields that work at different levels of analysis. Those scholars holding the "heroic" view of the Com­ mission are generally focused on the contest between national and supranational levels that character­ ized the 1992 program and subsequent major steps toward European integration. By contrast, those scholars with the "bureaucratic politics" view are generally authors of case studies or legislative his­ tories of individual EU directives or decisions. However, the fact that these twO images of the Commis­ sion are often two ships passing in the night hardly implies that there is no dispute. Clearly both views cannot be right; but then, how can we explain the significant support each enjoys from the empirical record? The CommiSSion, perhaps the single most important supranational body in the world, certainly deserves better than the schizophrenic interpretation the EU studies community has given it. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution toward the unraveling of this paradox. In brief, the argument I make is as follows: the European Commission can be effective in pursuit of its broad integration goals in spite of, and even because of, its internal divisions. The folk wisdom that too many chefs spoil the broth may often be true, but it need not always be so. The paper is organized as follows. 1 begin with an elaboration of the theoretical position briefly out­ lined above. 1 then tum to a case study from the major Commission efforts to restructure the computer industry in the context of its 1992 program. The computer sector does not merely provide interesting, random illustrations of the hypothesis 1 have advanced. Rather, as Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman have stressed, the Commission's efforts on informatics formed one of the most crucial parts of the en­ tire 1992 program, and so the Commission's success in "Europeanizing" these issues had significant ripple effects across the entire European political economy. I conclude with some thoughts on the fol­ lowing question: now that the Commission has succeeded in bringing the world to its doorstep, does its bureaucratic division still serve a useful purpose?

The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine: a useful but flawed OSCE tool. EPC Policy Brief, 23 April 2015

The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine functions as the eyes and ears of the international community in Eastern Ukraine; it monitors, impartially, the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and observes whether or not both parties comply with the Minsk II Agreement. The success, or failure, of this Mission will not only be of crucial importance for the situation in Eastern Ukraine, but will also determine the OSCE’s entire future and ability to operate in conflict regions. Although the SMM is a flawed tool, Dennis Sammut and Joseph D’Urso argue that its deployment and the subsequent reinvigoration of OSCE is the perfect opportunity for the EU to rethink its relation to and position in the organisation, and to assume a bigger and more decisive role.

EU Mission in Kosovo (EULEX): Constructing Ambiguity or Constructive Disunity? Transatlantic Security Paper No. 3, June 2011

In which skies should auspices about the future of EU foreign policy be looked for, Libya’s or Kosovo’s? Many commentators have been prompt in digging the grave for EU Security and Defense Policy after Member States’ discordance over taking military action against the Qaddafi regime1. However, as this paper will emphasize through the case of Kosovo, unanimity is not always an indispensable prerequisite – and should not be regarded as the sole criteria – to EU action in regional security. Overly focusing on the ‘speak with one voice’ mantra sometimes leads to stop short of assessing actual outcomes.

EU-Turkey Summit on the refugee crisis Law and (dis)order? EPC Commentary, 21 March 2016

After many meetings and long hours of negotiations, the overwhelming feeling when a deal between the EU and Turkey was struck, was one of “mission accomplished”! Faced with an unprecedented crisis and forced to appease increasingly hostile public opinions back home, EU leaders had only one objective in mind: reducing the number of migrants arriving in the EU so that order can return in the framework of EU rules. However, a closer look at the Summit Conclusions and the EU-Turkey statement leaves a bitter taste, according to Yves Pascouau. In this Commentary, he questions the feasibility of the final EU-Turkey deal, saying that it creates more problems than it solves: besides the obvious legal and practical issues, it is far from certain which member states will be willing to do their part, or whether or not the EU can come up with a strategic vision on human mobility for the future.

Clinical prediction of large vessel occlusion in anterior circulation stroke: mission impossible?

Simple clinical scores to predict large vessel occlusion (LVO) in acute ischemic stroke would be helpful to triage patients in the prehospital phase. We assessed the ability of various combinations of National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (NIHSS) subitems and published stroke scales (i.e., RACE scale, 3I-SS, sNIHSS-8, sNIHSS-5, sNIHSS-1, mNIHSS, a-NIHSS items profiles A-E, CPSS1, CPSS2, and CPSSS) to predict LVO on CT or MR arteriography in 1085 consecutive patients (39.4 % women, mean age 67.7 years) with anterior circulation strokes within 6 h of symptom onset. 657 patients (61 %) had an occlusion of the internal carotid artery or the M1/M2 segment of the middle cerebral artery. Best cut-off value of the total NIHSS score to predict LVO was 7 (PPV 84.2 %, sensitivity 81.0 %, specificity 76.6 %, NPV 72.4 %, ACC 79.3 %). Receiver operating characteristic curves of various combinations of NIHSS subitems and published scores were equally or less predictive to show LVO than the total NIHSS score. At intersection of sensitivity and specificity curves in all scores, at least 1/5 of patients with LVO were missed. Best odds ratios for LVO among NIHSS subitems were best gaze (9.6, 95 %-CI 6.765-13.632), visual fields (7.0, 95 %-CI 3.981-12.370), motor arms (7.6, 95 %-CI 5.589-10.204), and aphasia/neglect (7.1, 95 %-CI 5.352-9.492). There is a significant correlation between clinical scores based on the NIHSS score and LVO on arteriography. However, if clinically relevant thresholds are applied to the scores, a sizable number of LVOs are missed. Therefore, clinical scores cannot replace vessel imaging.

Les caractères musicaux au sein d'une démarche artistique dramatique : exploration des indices acoustiques jouant un rôle dans l'évocation des états affectifs en musique.

Cette thèse de doctorat en composition comprend deux projets de nature différente et complémentaire : (1) un projet de recherche théorique sur la communication des caractères musicaux; (2) un projet artistique s'articulant autour de la composition de trois pièces : L'homme à deux têtes - opéra de chambre, Un instant dans l'esprit de Lovecraft - pour clarinette solo, orchestre à cordes et percussions, et Balade ornithologique - pour orchestre à vents. La conception de la musique comme un moyen de communication est à l'origine de cette recherche théorique qui est motivée par un désir de compréhension des stratégies d'expressions des émotions en musique, à partir du point de vue du compositeur. Cette thèse aborde les modèles de communication, le concept de personnage virtuel et la théorie de la contagion des humeurs. Par la suite, nous détaillerons les indices acoustiques menant à la perception des caractères musicaux. Toutes ces notions sont illustrées et explorées par la composition de miniature ayant un caractère bien ciblé. Finalement, nous proposons un système d'analyse musical des caractères et des émotions qui est appliqué à l'analyse de sections des pièces composées au cours de ce projet de doctorat. Ce dernier chapitre met en lumière les stratégies utilisées pour créer un discours dramatique tout en exposant l'évocation de différents caractères musicaux.

Report of the 1964 Trade Mission to Venezuela.

"A supplement to International Commerce."