981 resultados para three-tier architecture
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v.39:no.25(1959)
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The Pernambuco Center of Endemism (PCE) in northeastern Brazil is highly fragmented and degraded. Despite its potential conservation importance the bird fauna in this area is still relatively unknown and there are many remnant fragments that have not been systematically surveyed. Here, we report the results of bird surveys in five forest fragments (one pioneer, two ombrophilous and two seasonal). In total, 162 taxa were recorded, 12 of which are endemic to the PCE. The frequency of endangered species was lower than what has been reported in studies from the same area and most of the taxa considered to be at risk of extinction were sub-species of uncertain taxonomic validity. The comparatively low number of endemic/threatened species may be due to the small size of the fragments in the present study - a consequence of the high levels of habitat loss in this region. Analysis of species richness patterns indicates that ombrophilous forest fragments are acting as refuges for those bird species that are most sensitive to environmental degradation.
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Three new species of Neodrassex Ott, 2012 are described from Brazil: N. cachimbo sp. nov. from state of Pará, N. nordeste sp. nov. from state of Piauí and N. ibirapuita sp. nov. from state of Rio Grande do Sul.
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Terrestrial isopods are important and dominant component of meso and macrodecomposer soil communities. The present study investigates the diversity and species composition of terrestrial isopods on three forests on the Serra Geral of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. The area has two natural formations (Primary Woodland and Secondary Woodland) and one plantation of introduced Pinus. The pitfall traps operated from March 2001 to May 2002, with two summer periods and one winter. There were 14 sampling dates overall. Of the five species found: Alboscia silveirensis Araujo, 1999, Atlantoscia floridana (van Name, 1940), Benthana araucariana Araujo & Lopes, 2003 (Philoscidae), Balloniscus glaber Araujo & Zardo, 1995 (Balloniscidae) and Styloniscus otakensis (Chilton, 1901) (Styloniscidae); only A. floridana is abundant on all environments and B. glaber is nearly exclusive for the native forests. The obtained data made it possible to infer about population characteristics of this species. The Similarity Analysis showed a quantitative difference among the Secondary forest and Pinus plantation, but not a qualitative one. The operational sex ratio (OSR) analysis for A. floridana does not reveal significant differences in male and female proportions among environments. The reproductive period identified in the present study for A. floridana was from spring to autumn in the primary forest and Pinus plantation and during all year for the secondary forest. The OSR analysis for B. glaber reveals no significant differences in abundance between males and females for secondary forest, but the primary forest was a significant difference. The reproductive period for B. glaber extended from summer to autumn (for primary and secondary forest). This is the first record for Brazil of an established terrestrial isopod population in a Pinus sp. plantation area, evidenced by the presence of young, adults and ovigerous females, balanced sex ratio, expected fecundity and reproduction pattern, as compared to populations from native vegetation areas.
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This study aims at analyzing the determinants of FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows for a group of European regions. The originality of this approach lies in the use of disaggregated regional data. First, we develop a qualitative description of our database and discuss the importance of the macroeconomic determinants in attracting FDI. Then, we provide an econometric exercise to identify the potential determinants of FDI. In spite of choosing regions presenting economic similarities, we show that regional FDI inflows rely on a combination of factors that differs from one region to another.
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We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
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We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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Num lote de 10 vespas, estilopizadas, gentilmente cedidas para estudo pelo Dr. R. L. Araujo, de S. Paulo, os A. A., identificaram 5 espécies do gênero Xenos Rossius (Família Stylopidae): Xenos bohlsi Hoffmann, descrita do Paraguai e Xenos bonairensis Brèthes, descrita da Argentina, e 3 consideradas novas, que são aqui descritas.
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The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.
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We have compared three cases of payments for water-related environmental services (PES) in Central America, in terms of socioeconomic background, opportunity costs of forest conservation and stakeholders’ perceptions on the conditions of water resources and other issues. We found that, in general, the foregone benefits from land uses alternative to forest cover are larger than the amount paid, which apparently contradicts the economic foundation of PES schemes. A number of possible explanations are explored. The results also suggest that trade-offs between different environmental and social goals are likely to emerge in PES schemes, posing some doubts on their ability to be multipurpose instruments for environmental improvement and rural development. We also found that PES schemes may work as a conflictresolution instrument, facilitating downstream -upstream problem solving, though at the same time they might introduce changes in social perceptions of property rights.
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Thirty-six persons living on a farm located in the state of Minas Gerais (Brazil) were studied. Nine of them had the glandular form of toxoplasmosis, between May and August, 1976. These nine cases of toxoplasmosis were confirmed serologically by immunefluorescence-IF-, presenting IgG antibody titres between 1:4096 and 1:32000 and IgM antibody titres between 1:16 and 1:8000. Twelve out of thirty-six persons studied were considered to be "dubious cases". They were defined either by presenting a clinical picture compatible with acquired toxoplasmosis, yet having low serologic titres, or inversely they did not have a clear clinical picture but had serologic evidence of recent Toxoplasma infection. Fifteen out of thirty-six persons studied showed neither serologic nor clinical evidence of recent Toxoplasma infection. The epidemiologic information suggests two possible modes of transmission: a) poorly cooked pork at a barbecue party; b) farm vegetables and soil contaminated with Toxoplasma gondii oocysts (rat-cat cycle). Serologic follow-up nine months later in the human farm population demonstrated still high IgG titres, yet they tended to decline and IgM titres became negative. Three years later most of the IgG titres continued to decline and were almost compatible with the titres obtained in Brazilian population surveys.
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The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.