LSTA Five Year Plan 2003-2007, 2007

The Iowa Commission of Libraries, the State Library’s governing board, convened the Library Services Task Force in August 2000. This group consisted of 46 Iowans from across the state, including librarians from all types of libraries, library trustees, legislators, members of Iowa Regional Library system (now called Library Service Areas) and Area Education Agencies, and citizens. Their mission was to make recommendations to the Commission on positioning libraries to effectively and efficiently meet the future needs of Iowans. Needs and expectations of Iowa Library customers and funding authorities were identified and examined by the Task Force, and are reflected in its recommendations. The Commission received the Task Force recommendations in December 2000, carefully studied them, solicited input from the Iowa library community, and with a few changes, forwarded the recommendations to the Governor and the Iowa General Assembly. These recommendations are now known as Iowa Commission of Libraries priorities and serve as a blueprint for future development of the Iowa library system. A second need assessment was conducted in 2001 as part of the process to formulate the joint Library Service Area – State Library Plan of Service 2003-2005. Biennial development of this plan is mandated by the Code of Iowa. In 2001, Library Service Area and Library Development staff from the State Library chose to completely revamp this plan, and used the process outlined in the The New Planning for Results by Sandra Nelson (the Public Library Association planning model) to do so. The group conducted a strengths/weaknesses/opportunities/threat analysis of the Iowa library situation, identified needs and put them in priority order, and identified service responses. Needs identified by the Library Services Task Force were similar to those identified by the Library Service Area and Library Development staff group. These needs were further analyzed and documented by State Library staff during the development of the LSTA plan. Sources consulted are identified in the text of the LSTA plan and/or listed at the close of this document. The text of the Library Services Task Force report and the documents created during the development of the Plan of Service 2003-2005 are cited in the appendix to this document.

Motivating Students to Learn English: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Strategies to Meet the Needs of First Time Learners

Motivation is the key to learning. The present study is about the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as they affect learning with regard to students who are learning EFL for the first time. Cape Verdean seventh grade students learning English for the first time are generally very enthusiastic about the language before they start learning it in the high school. However, that enthusiasm seems not to be maintained throughout the school year and oftentimes teachers hear them complain about the difficulties of mastering aspects of the language. It seems that for some reason their motivation is undermined. Why does that happen? Is it the students’ fault or the teacher’s? If it the teacher’s fault, which motivation strategies work best to cope with this problem: intrinsic or extrinsic? With this in mind I asked the question: What is the relationship between students’ needs, interests, goals and expectations to learn English as a foreign language and teachers’ roles as facilitators and motivators? There are many studies that have been carried out in the field of motivation, and up to now, there seems to be no consensus of which is the best. For the purposes of this paper, three main theories will be discussed that have prevailed in the field of motivational psychology: the behavioural, the cognitive and the humanistic theories. Within these theories sub-theories are discussed and their relationship is explained with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation regarding Cape Verdean students learning English for the first time.

First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).

Competency Guide, 2006

On the Human Resource Management Roadmap (see page 7 of the State of Iowa Workforce Planning Guide, February 2006) there is a bar that crosses all four phases of human resource management. That section indicates that competencies are an integral part of the entire employment cycle. Competencies describe job requirements, which means they lay out the expectations for the job incumbent as well as the supervisor as they relate to planning for the job, recruiting and filling the job, developing the incumbent’s skills, assessing the incumbent’s performance, and finally, determining how those same competencies relate, if at all, to refilling the position when it becomes vacant in the future.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

On the cultural transmission of corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmissionof values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.

Geometric and long run aspects of Granger causality

This paper extends multivariate Granger causality to take into account the subspacesalong which Granger causality occurs as well as long run Granger causality. The propertiesof these new notions of Granger causality, along with the requisite restrictions, are derivedand extensively studied for a wide variety of time series processes including linear invertibleprocess and VARMA. Using the proposed extensions, the paper demonstrates that: (i) meanreversion in L2 is an instance of long run Granger non-causality, (ii) cointegration is a specialcase of long run Granger non-causality along a subspace, (iii) controllability is a special caseof Granger causality, and finally (iv) linear rational expectations entail (possibly testable)Granger causality restriction along subspaces.

The equity premium and the risk free rate: A cross country, cross maturity examination

This paper examines the relationship between the equity premium and the risk free rate at three different maturities using post 1973 data fora panel of 7 OECD countries. We show the existence of subsample instabilities,of some cross country differences and of inconsistencies with the expectations theory of the term structure. We perform simulations using a standard consumptionbased CAPM model and demonstrate that the basic features of Mehra and Prescott's(1985) puzzle remain, regardless of the time period, the investment maturity and the country considered. Modifications of the basic setup are also considered.

Speed of convergence of recursive least squares learning with ARMA perceptions

This paper fills a gap in the existing literature on least squareslearning in linear rational expectations models by studying a setup inwhich agents learn by fitting ARMA models to a subset of the statevariables. This is a natural specification in models with privateinformation because in the presence of hidden state variables, agentshave an incentive to condition forecasts on the infinite past recordsof observables. We study a particular setting in which it sufficesfor agents to fit a first order ARMA process, which preserves thetractability of a finite dimensional parameterization, while permittingconditioning on the infinite past record. We describe how previousresults (Marcet and Sargent [1989a, 1989b] can be adapted to handlethe convergence of estimators of an ARMA process in our self--referentialenvironment. We also study ``rates'' of convergence analytically and viacomputer simulation.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.