Free movement of workers in the EU. Legal aspects of the transitional arrangements. ZEI Discussion Paper No. 217, 2013

From the Introduction. There are four fundamental freedoms which lay the foundation of the European Union. Those are the free movement of goods, free movement of capital, free movement of services and free movement of persons. They guarantee the existence and effective functioning of an area without internal borders within which goods, capital, services and people move freely. Despite the pivotal importance of these freedoms, there are cases where some freedoms can be partially or fully restricted within the territory of some member states or the Union as a whole. This thesis is going to analyze the restrictions of one of these freedoms: the free movement of persons, resulting from the arrangements applying to new member states. The focus will be the free movement of workers from new to old member states for a transitional period following the date of accession.

Judicial Selection, Lay Participation, and Judicial Culture in the Czech Republic: A Study in a Central European (Non)Transformation. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 03/2014

Introduction. The idea that “merit” should be the guiding principle of judicial selections is a universal principle, unlikely to be contested in whatever legal system. What differs considerably across legal cultures, however, is the way in which “merit” is defined. For deeper cultural and historical reasons, the current definition of “merit” in the process of judicial selections in the Czech Republic, at least in the way it is implemented in the institutional settings, is an odd mongrel. The old technocratic Austrian judicial heritage has in some aspects merged with, in others was altered or destroyed, by the Communist past. After 1989, some aspects of the judicial organisation were amended, with the most problematic elements removed. Furthermore, several old as well as new provisions relating to the judiciary were struck down by the Constitutional Court. However, apart from these rather haphazard interventions, there has been neither a sustained discussion as to how a new judicial architecture and system of judicial appointments ought to look like nor much of broader, conceptual reform in this regard. Thus, some twenty five years after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the guiding principles for judicial selection and appointments are still a debate to be had.