On the Epistemology of Narrative Theory: Narratology and Other Theories of Fictional Narrative

In this article, I propose to analyze narrative theory from an epistemological standpoint. To do so, I will draw upon both Genettian narratology and what I would call, following Shigeyuki Kuroda, “non-communicational” theories of fictional narrative. In spite of their very unequal popularity, I consider these theories as objective, or, in other words, as debatable and ripe for rational analyses; one can choose between them. The article is made up of three parts. The first part concerns the object of narrative theory, or the narrative as a constructed object, both in narratology (where narrative is likened to a narrative discourse) and in non-communicational narrative theories (where fictional narrative and discourse are mutually exclusive categories). The second part takes up the question of how the claims of these theories do or do not lend themselves to falsification. In particular, Gérard Genette’s claim that “every narrative is, explicitly or not, ‘in the first person’”, will be considered, through the lens of Ann Banfield’s theory of free indirect style. In the third part the reductionism of narrative theory will be dealt with. This leads to a reflection on the role of narrative theory in the analysis of fictional narratives.

Narrative, Memory and the Crisis of Mimesis: the Case of Adam Elsheimer and Giordano Bruno

The triangular space between memory, narrative and pictorial representation is the terrain on which this article is developed. Taking the art of memory developed by Giordano Bruno (1548 – 1600) and the art of painting subtly revolutionised by Adam Elsheimer (1578 – 1610) as test-cases, it is shown how both subvert the norms of mimesis and narration prevalent throughout the Renaissance, how disrupted memory creates “incoherent” narratives, and how perspective and the notion of “place” are questioned in a corollary way. Two paintings by Elsheimer are analysed and shown to include, in spite of their supposed “realism”, numerous incoherencies, aporias and strange elements – often overlooked. Thus, they do not conform to two of the basic rules governing both the classical art of memory and the humanist art of painting: well-defined places and the exhaustive translatability of words into images (and vice-versa). In the work of Bruno, both his philosophical claims and the literary devices he uses are analysed as hints for a similar (and contemporaneous) undermining of conventions about the transparency and immediacy of representation.