898 resultados para Tunney amendment


Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A key element of Russia’s policy towards the new government of Ukraine concerns demands for a constitutional reform that would transform the country from a unitary into a federal state in a way that would considerably privilege the eastern and southern regions. Such a change to Ukraine’s administrative system would enable Moscow to put pressure on Ukraine’s central government via the regions. In order to achieve its objectives, Russia has been pressuring Kyiv to establish a constitutional assembly in a form that would guarantee the endorsement of solutions dictated by Russia. In other words, Russia has been demanding, in what is practically an ultimatum, that Ukraine give up one of the fundamental sovereign rights of a state, the right to freely determine its system of government. Transforming Ukraine into a federal state is an unacceptable idea, primarily because the intention behind Russia’s demands is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, both through the content of the proposed changes and the way in which they are to be implemented. However, keeping in place the current, centralist model of state governance is not a feasible alternative. Ukraine will have to grant its regions broad self-governance powers, including the power to hold local referendums, and to transfer a considerable portion of the prerogatives currently held by the state to the local self-governments, along with adequate financial resources. That is because decentralisation along these lines is the only way forward towards a modern democracy in Ukraine. Russia’s policy has forced Kyiv to undertake legislative work on constitutional reform as a matter of urgency, rather than waiting until a new parliament is elected in which the new, post-Maidan balance of political power will be reflected, as political logic would require. The first draft of the constitutional amendments (of which no details are known at this stage) is to be presented in mid-May, and is expected to come into force in early autumn. However, whether these plans can be put into practice depends on further developments in the eastern part of Ukraine, because (among other reasons) if a state of emergency is introduced, the constitutional amendment process will have to be suspended.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The new constitution will come into force in Hungary on 1 January 20121. Its adoption is part of the state reform which the Fidesz party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been implementing since it won the election in April 2010. Fidesz, along with the Christian Democrats which support it, has a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes in parliament and may introduce solutions to facilitate its rule without support from other groupings and it is taking advantage of this opportunity. One example of this has been the amendment of the constitution ten times followed by a speedy adoption of a new constitution. The next step will be passing dozens of constitutional laws which regulate essential areas of the functioning of the state over the next few months. Both the way and the scope in which the changes have been made have raised controversies both at home and abroad. The regulations reinforce the position of the ruling camp on the Hungarian political scene, assisting it in passing the test of the next elections. Slovakia, which has criticised the practice of granting Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in other countries, is opposing the promise of also granting them electoral rights. The constitutional reinforcement of the state’s ‘responsibility’ for the diaspora linked with the collective concept of national minority rights fostered by Hungary has already led to tensions in the region.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Fifty years after its original drafting, the German constitution has seen its text amended many times. Indeed, among OECD countries, the Grundgesetz has one of the highest rates of constitutional change. This paper analyzes these changes. It does so in a quantitative manner in its first section, before proceeding to ask how the numerous changes can be explained. Three approaches from the legal and political science literature are presented: one emphasizing historical-structural factors, one analyzing changes as constitutional revisionism, and an institutional approach which focuses on the conditions for constitutional amendment. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are then compared and contrasted, before the article concludes with an assessment of the characteristics of Gemuw constitutional policy.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

At head of title: Prepared for the AID Percy Amendment Subcommittee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Rural Development.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

"Contract no. AID/csd-1168 ; PIO/T 520-185-3-90008, amendment no. 1".

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Pt. 3 on Amendment No. 438 to S. 1659.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Includes Amendment #1, amended September 1979.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Registration of sources of radiation [form] (OH-R-1)

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Marketing agreement no. 2 has title: ... Marketing agreement series no. 1. License series 1. Marketing agreement and license for cling peaches canned in the state of California ... Marketing agreement no. 2. License no. 2 (Do not confuse with Agreement no. 1)

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.

Relevância:

10.00% 10.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Title from cover.