Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level

Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level from London to St. Catharines, April 1847.

Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level

Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level from London to St. Catharines. This sheet is signed by S.D. Woodruff, Jan. 11, 1847.

Approximate cost of completing the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines and an estimate of the cost of the piers at Port Dalhousie signed by William Hamilton Merritt

Approximate cost of completing the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines and an estimate of the cost of the piers at Port Dalhousie signed by William Hamilton Merritt (5 pages, handwritten), July 8, 1854.

Approximate estimate of the cost of completing the Port Dalhousie Railway to the Grand Central Railway Station at Lock 12

Approximate estimate of the cost of completing the Port Dalhousie Railway to the Grand Central Railway Station at Lock 12. This document is badly torn and burned but most of the text is legible, July 14, 1854.

Estimated cost of the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway sent to George Rykert by S.D. Woodruff

Estimated cost of the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway sent to George Rykert by S.D. Woodruff, Aug. 5, 1854.

Approximate estimate of the cost of constructing and completing the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway to St. Catharines

Approximate estimate of the cost of constructing and completing the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway to St. Catharines signed by S.D. Woodruff (2 pages, handwritten), Jan. 8, 1855.

Cost of the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines

Cost of the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines (1 page, handwritten), Jan. 11, 1855.

Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12

Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12 (2 copies) [one appears to be a rough copy] (2 pages, handwritten), Feb. 2, 1855.

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson (2 pages, handwritten), n.d.

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns, January, 1878.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

The euro impact of the banking system of Greece : cost-benefit analysis.

Rapport de recherche

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.

An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method

We o¤er an axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method of Friedman and Moulin (1999). The key property in our axiom system is Group Demand Monotonicity, asking that when a group of agents raise their demands, not all of them should pay less.