"MIATA"-minimal information about T cell assays.

Immunotherapy, especially therapeutic vaccination, has a great deal of potential in the treatment of cancer and certain infectious diseases such as HIV (Allison et al., 2006; Fauci et al., 2008; Feldmann and Steinman, 2005). Numerous vaccine candidates have been tested in patients with a variety of tumor types and chronic viral diseases. Often, the best way to assess the clinical potential of these vaccines is to monitor the induced T cell response, and yet there are currently no standards for reporting these results. This letter is an effort to address this problem.

Memòria de recerca: paral·lelització dels diccionaris de la Standard Template Library de C++

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Universität Karlsruhe entre gener i maig del 2007. Les biblioteques d’estructures de dades defineixen interfícies i implementen algorismes i estructures de dades fonamentals. Un exemple n’és la Satandard Template Library (STL ), que forma part del llenguatge de programació C++. En el marc d’una tesi, s’està treballant per obtenir implementacions més eficients i/o versàtils d’alguns components de la STL. Per a fer-ho s’utilitzen tècniques de la enginyeria d’algorismes. En particular, s’integra el coneixement de la comunitat algorítmica i es té en consideració la tecnologia existent. L’acció durant l’estada s’ha emmarcat en el desenvolupament la Multi Core STL (MCSTL ). La MCSTL és una implementació paral•lela de la STL per a màquines multi-core. Les màquines multi-core són actualment l’únic tipus de màquina disponible al mercat. Per tant, tot i que el paral•lelisme obtingut no sigui òptim, és preferible a tenir els processadors esperant, ja que , la tendència és que el nombre de processadors per computador augmenti.

New perspectives in the use of ink evidence in forensic science: Part I. Development of a quality assurance process for forensic ink analysis by HPTLC

The level of information provided by ink evidence to the criminal and civil justice system is limited. The limitations arise from the weakness of the interpretative framework currently used, as proposed in the ASTM 1422-05 and 1789-04 on ink analysis. It is proposed to use the likelihood ratio from the Bayes theorem to interpret ink evidence. Unfortunately, when considering the analytical practices, as defined in the ASTM standards on ink analysis, it appears that current ink analytical practices do not allow for the level of reproducibility and accuracy required by a probabilistic framework. Such framework relies on the evaluation of the statistics of the ink characteristics using an ink reference database and the objective measurement of similarities between ink samples. A complete research programme was designed to (a) develop a standard methodology for analysing ink samples in a more reproducible way, (b) comparing automatically and objectively ink samples and (c) evaluate the proposed methodology in a forensic context. This report focuses on the first of the three stages. A calibration process, based on a standard dye ladder, is proposed to improve the reproducibility of ink analysis by HPTLC, when these inks are analysed at different times and/or by different examiners. The impact of this process on the variability between the repetitive analyses of ink samples in various conditions is studied. The results show significant improvements in the reproducibility of ink analysis compared to traditional calibration methods.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Innovative method for carbon dioxide determination in human postmortem cardiac gas samples using headspace-gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and stable labeled isotope as internal standard.

A novel approach to measure carbon dioxide (CO2) in gaseous samples, based on a precise and accurate quantification by (13)CO2 internal standard generated in situ is presented. The main goal of this study was to provide an innovative headspace-gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (HS-GC-MS) method applicable in the routine determination of CO2. The main drawback of the GC methods discussed in the literature for CO2 measurement is the lack of a specific internal standard necessary to perform quantification. CO2 measurement is still quantified by external calibration without taking into account analytical problems which can often occur considering gaseous samples. To avoid the manipulation of a stable isotope-labeled gas, we have chosen to generate in situ an internal labeled standard gas ((13)CO2) on the basis of the stoichiometric formation of CO2 by the reaction of hydrochloric acid (HCl) with sodium hydrogen carbonate (NaH(13)CO3). This method allows a precise measurement of CO2 concentration and was validated on various human postmortem gas samples in order to study its efficiency.

Time Horizons And Smoothing In The Bank Of England’s Reaction Function: The Contrast Between The Standard GMM And Ex Ante Forecast Approaches

The monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England is estimated by the standard GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method developed by Goodhart (2005), with particular attention to the horizons for inflation and output at which each approach gives the best fit. The horizons for the ex-ante approach are much closer to what is implied by the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, while the GMM approach produces an implausibly slow adjustment of the interest rate, and suffers from a weak instruments problem. These findings suggest a strong preference for the ex-ante approach.

Time Horizons And Smoothing In The Bank Of England’s Reaction Function: The Contrast Between The Standard GMM And Ex Ante Forecast Approaches

The monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England is estimated by the standard GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method developed by Goodhart (2005), with particular attention to the horizons for inflation and output at which each approach gives the best fit. The horizons for the ex-ante approach are much closer to what is implied by the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, while the GMM approach produces an implausibly slow adjustment of the interest rate, and suffers from a weak instruments problem. These findings suggest a strong preference for the ex-ante approach.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

Characterizing Behavioral Decisions with Choice Datas

A number of different models with behavioral economics have a reduced form representation where potentially boundedly rational decision-makers do not necessarily internalize all the consequences of their actions on payoff relevant features (which we label as psychological states) of the choice environment. This paper studies the restrictions that such behavioral models impose on choice data and the implications they have for welfare analysis. First, we propose a welfare benchmark that is justified using standard axioms of rational choice and can be applied to a number of existing seminal behavioral economics models. Second, we show that Sen's axioms and fully characterize choice data consistent with behavioral decision-makers. Third, we show how choice data to infer information about the normative signi.cance of psychological states and establish the possibility of identifying welfare dominated choices.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks.