PoS-tagging the Web in Portuguese. National varieties, text typologies and spelling systems

The great amount of text produced every day in the Web turned it as one of the main sources for obtaining linguistic corpora, that are further analyzed with Natural Language Processing techniques. On a global scale, languages such as Portuguese - official in 9 countries - appear on the Web in several varieties, with lexical, morphological and syntactic (among others) differences. Besides, a unified spelling system for Portuguese has been recently approved, and its implementation process has already started in some countries. However, it will last several years, so different varieties and spelling systems coexist. Since PoS-taggers for Portuguese are specifically built for a particular variety, this work analyzes different training corpora and lexica combinations aimed at building a model with high-precision annotation in several varieties and spelling systems of this language. Moreover, this paper presents different dictionaries of the new orthography (Spelling Agreement) as well as a new freely available testing corpus, containing different varieties and textual typologies.

Active Visual Features Based on Events to Guide Robot Manipulators in Tracking Tasks

Traditional visual servoing systems do not deal with the topic of moving objects tracking. When these systems are employed to track a moving object, depending on the object velocity, visual features can go out of the image, causing the fail of the tracking task. This occurs specially when the object and the robot are both stopped and then the object starts the movement. In this work, we have employed a retina camera based on Address Event Representation (AER) in order to use events as input in the visual servoing system. The events launched by the camera indicate a pixel movement. Event visual information is processed only at the moment it occurs, reducing the response time of visual servoing systems when they are used to track moving objects.

Beyond the H2/CO2 upper bound: one-step crystallization and separation of nano-sized ZIF-11 by centrifugation and its application in mixed matrix membranes

The synthesis of nano-sized ZIF-11 with an average size of 36 ± 6 nm is reported. This material has been named nano-zeolitic imidazolate framework-11 (nZIF-11). It has the same chemical composition and thermal stability and analogous H2 and CO2 adsorption properties to the conventional microcrystalline ZIF-11 (i.e. 1.9 ± 0.9 μm). nZIF-11 has been obtained following the centrifugation route, typically used for solid separation, as a fast new technique (pioneering for MOFs) for obtaining nanomaterials where the temperature, time and rotation speed can easily be controlled. Compared to the traditional synthesis consisting of stirring + separation, the reaction time was lowered from several hours to a few minutes when using this centrifugation synthesis technique. Employing the same reaction time (2, 5 or 10 min), micro-sized ZIF-11 was obtained using the traditional synthesis while nano-scale ZIF-11 was achieved only by using centrifugation synthesis. The small particle size obtained for nZIF-11 allowed the use of the wet MOF sample as a colloidal suspension stable in chloroform. This helped to prepare mixed matrix membranes (MMMs) by direct addition of the membrane polymer (polyimide Matrimid®) to the colloidal suspension, avoiding particle agglomeration resulting from drying. The MMMs were tested for H2/CO2 separation, improving the pure polymer membrane performance, with permeation values of 95.9 Barrer of H2 and a H2/CO2 separation selectivity of 4.4 at 35 °C. When measured at 200 °C, these values increased to 535 Barrer and 9.1.

A Novel Prediction Method for Early Recognition of Global Human Behaviour in Image Sequences

Human behaviour recognition has been, and still remains, a challenging problem that involves different areas of computational intelligence. The automated understanding of people activities from video sequences is an open research topic in which the computer vision and pattern recognition areas have made big efforts. In this paper, the problem is studied from a prediction point of view. We propose a novel method able to early detect behaviour using a small portion of the input, in addition to the capabilities of it to predict behaviour from new inputs. Specifically, we propose a predictive method based on a simple representation of trajectories of a person in the scene which allows a high level understanding of the global human behaviour. The representation of the trajectory is used as a descriptor of the activity of the individual. The descriptors are used as a cue of a classification stage for pattern recognition purposes. Classifiers are trained using the trajectory representation of the complete sequence. However, partial sequences are processed to evaluate the early prediction capabilities having a specific observation time of the scene. The experiments have been carried out using the three different dataset of the CAVIAR database taken into account the behaviour of an individual. Additionally, different classic classifiers have been used for experimentation in order to evaluate the robustness of the proposal. Results confirm the high accuracy of the proposal on the early recognition of people behaviours.

Letter from James Otis, Jr. to James Otis, Sr., and portrait print of James Otis Jr., 1743 June 17

Letter from Otis in Boston to his father, James Otis Sr. on June 17, 1743. In the short, half-page letter, Otis asks his father for money to pay for expenses relating to Commencement including the printing of theses, shoes, buckles, and any entertainment. He mentions that he will share entertainment expenses with his classmate Lothrop Russell.

Rules and orders relating to a Professor of the Mathematicks, of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, in Harvard College, 18 January 1726

This folder contains a single document describing the "rules and orders" of the Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. The document begins by defining the subjects to be taught by the Hollis Professor including natural and experimental philosophy, elements of geometry, and the principles of astronomy and geography. It then outlines the number of public and private lectures to be given to students, how much extra time the professor should spend with students reviewing any difficulties they may encounter understanding class subject matter discussed, and stipulates that the professor's duties shall be restricted solely to his teaching activities and not involve him in any religious activities at the College or oblige him to teach any additional studies other than those specified for the Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. Furthermore, the rules establish the professor's salary at £80 per year and allow the professor to receive from students, except those students studying theology under the Hollis Professor of Divinity, an additional fee as determined by the Corporation and Board of Overseers, to supplement his income. Moreover, the rules assert that all professorship candidates selected by the Harvard Corporation must be approved by Thomas Hollis during his lifetime or by his executor after his death. Finally, the rules state that the Hollis professor take an oath to the civil government and declare himself a member of the Protestant reformed religion. This document is signed by Thomas Hollis and four witnesses, John Hollis, Joshua Hollis, Richard Solly, and John Williams.

Letter from Samuel Willard, Lancaster, Massachusetts, to William Willard and Katherine Willard, Petersham, Massachusetts, October 14, 1800

Willard apologizes for and describes disciplinary action taken against him by Harvard’s government, and explains that he has been sent to study under Reverend Thayer in Lancaster.

New York, N.Y. and vicinity, 1899 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: New York City and vicinity, H.M. Wilson, geographer in charge ; triangulation by U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey ; topography by S.H. Bodfish ... [et al. and] U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, N.Y. City Government and the Geological Survey of New Jersey. It was published by U.S.G.S. in 1899. Scale 1:62,500. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Zone 18N NAD83 projection. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as roads, railroads, drainage, cities and towns, villages, forts, cemeteries, aqueducts, boundaries, and more. Relief is shown with standard contour intervals of 20 feet. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from The Harvard Map Collection as part of the Imaging the Urban Environment project. Maps selected for this project represent major urban areas and cities of the world, at various time periods. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features at a large scale. The selection represents a range of regions, originators, ground condition dates, scales, and purposes.

Japan and the European Union in the global economy. Bruegel Blueprint 22, 9 April 2014

This book is the final output of a strategic European Union-Japan research partnership, which we initiated in order to deepen our understanding of two major economies facing similar challenges and opportunities. This publication brings together scholars from Kobe University and Bruegel along with selected outside contributors from Japan and the EU from government and leading policy institutions.

EU integration and party politics in the Balkans. EPC Issue Paper No.77, September 2014

Throughout the Balkan region, popularly elected leaders consistently fail to meet the democratic standards set by the EU and, more importantly, they fall short of their voters’ expectations. Distrust in representative institutions and disengagement from political life runs dramatically high among the people of the Balkan countries, and this generalised sense of dissatisfaction is starting to breed cynicism also towards the idea of a better future inside the Union. This study highlights the interplay between EU integration and national politics in the region, and that both are consequential for the quality of Balkan democracies, as well as reminiscent of the Western and Central and Eastern European experience.

What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 125, 22.01.2014

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to disputes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led movement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Reforms in Moldova: Moderate progress and an uncertain outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 100, 2013-01-22

After coming to power in September 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE)1 coalition began implementing a wide-ranging programme of reforms, with a view to bringing Moldova closer to the European Union, and ultimately to ensure the country’s full membership of the EU. Today, Moldova is considered a clear leader in European integration among the members of the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme. This, however, has less to do with the concrete reforms introduced by the Moldovan government, and more to do with, on the one hand, Chișinău’s excellent public relations with Brussels, achieved through effective diplomacy; and on the other hand, the growing disillusionment with the lack of progress in other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine. Attempts to evaluate Moldova’s reforms have proven rather problematic. On the one hand, the ruling coalition has managed to make significant progress in the areas of civil liberties, human rights and electoral reform. The government has also successfully implemented regulations which have brought Moldova closer to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, and it has made headway in talks on visa liberalisation with Brussels. On the other hand, Chișinău has still not carried out the structural and economic reforms without which real change in the country will be impossible. No reforms have been introduced in the Ministry of the Interior, the Moldovan police force, or the judiciary. The AIE has also failed to decentralise governance and has had no real success in reducing corruption; its attempts to rebuild the country’s financial institutions have proved equally unsuccessful. The main reasons for this poor performance include mutual mistrust and conflicting interests among the coalition members, a shortage of financial resources, strong resistance to change by public administration staff, and significant pressure from those political and business groups whose interests could suffer as a result of the proposed reforms. It should also be noted that since the AIE took power, the international context of the reform efforts has undergone significant changes. On the one hand, the EU has been facing an economic crisis, which has had a negative impact on Moldovan exports and contributed to the worsening of the economic situation in the country; and on the other hand, Moldova has been offered membership of the Customs Union as a viable alternative to EU membership.

The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29

Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives. These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.

The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 90, 2012-09-20

The independence of the mass media has been regularly restricted over the past two years in Ukraine. Following a period of relative freedom in 2005–2010, the scope of direct and indirect government control of the press has increased, cancelling out the achievements of the Orange Revolution in this area. The press in Ukraine is less and less able to perform its role as watchdog on the government and politicians and as a reliable source of information on the situation in the country to the public. This is mainly due to: (1) the concentration of the most important mass media in the hands of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business interests depend on the government; (2) the use of the press as instruments in political and business competition; (3) the ruling class’s subordination of the institutions which supervise the press; (4) repression used against media critical of the government and (5) the lack of an independent public broadcasting corporation. As a consequence, the press has hardly any impact on the political processes taking place ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October. This is also an effect of a passiveness present in the Ukrainian public, who are tired of politics and are focused on social issues. Cases of abuse or corruption scandals revealed by the press do not provoke any response from the public and are rarely investigated by the public prosecution authorities. The more popular a given medium is, the more strongly it is controlled by the government. At present, television has to be recognised as the least reliable of the mass media. In turn, Internet news journals are characterised by the greatest pluralism but also have more limited accessibility. The political conditions in which the mass media operate in Ukraine lead to various forms of pathology. The most serious of them are censorship by the owners and self-censorship performed by journalists, and a great share of political advertorials. As the parliamentary election is approaching, the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market have been showing up with greater intensity.