989 resultados para Portuguese colonial war
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ser.3:v.10 (1922)
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ser.4:v.9-10 (1931-1932)
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ser.4:v.6-8 (1928-1930)
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ser.4:v.3-5 (1925-1927)
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ser.3:v.5-7 (1917-1919)
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ser.3:v.3-4 (1915-1916)
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ser.5:v.7-10 (1939-1942)
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3
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ser.3:v.1-2 (1913-1914)
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Mothers can improve the quality of their offspring by increasing the level of certain components in their eggs. To examine whether or not mothers increase deposition of such components in eggs as a function of food availability, we food-supplemented black-legged kittiwake females (Rissa tridactyla) before and during egg laying and compared deposition of androgens and antibodies into eggs of first and experimentally induced replacement clutches. Food-supplemented females transferred lower amounts of androgens and antibodies into eggs of induced replacement clutches than did non-food-supplemented mothers, whereas first clutches presented no differences between treatments. Our results suggest that when females are in lower condition, they transfer more androgens and antibodies into eggs to facilitate chick development despite potential long-term costs for juveniles. Females in prime condition may avoid these potential long-term costs because they can provide their chicks with more and higher quality resources.
Resumo:
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.