996 resultados para Partis politiques groupes de pression
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Présenté au 36e congrès de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).
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This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.
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The effect of long discussions between commissioners with divergent views on certain issues is obvious in the report: it is more oriented towards the short term than expected. Undue attention was paid to trade liberalization with the U.S., a region of the world which the report describes as one in relative decline. The report does not deal with a scenario wherein trade liberalization with the U.S.A. is seen as a necessary transitory measure leading towards diversification of Canada's trade relation away from North America. Such an examination would point to a different approach to the U.S.A. in the short term. The report does not deal with services, information and te telecommunication which are fundamental to the economic development of Canada. There is also overemphasis on commercial policy and relative neglect on the use of domestic policies, among them industrial policy, in the pursuit of Canada's objectives. The report notes the interdependence between commercial and domestic policies and rightly recommend that provinces must, as a consequence, be involved in trade liberalization discussions. It is argued that the report underestimates the pressures for extra- territorial application of U.S. policies to Canada and the pressure for harmonization of policies which would follow trade liberalization. The report pays no attention to the implications of offshore investment going primarily to the U.S.A. and does not pay adequate attention to the role of investment to deal with adjustment problems. Available studies would have allowed the commissioners to clarify the determinants of investment decisions by Canadian head offices who have established subsidiaries in the U.S.A. but they were not examined. Little attention was paid to the role of transnationals and intrafirm trade in examining the implications of trade liberalization. The importance given to the reduction of regional disparities in earned incomes is welcome. However, the recommandation to leave regional development to provinces and municipalities denies the importance of national policies in the attainment of regionalization job equilization the impact of new CAD-CAM-telecommunications technologies on location decisions for the production of goods and services was not examined. Nor were the extent of and changes in interregional (i.e. interprovincial and more particularly province-state) trade flows examined. Knowledge of these patterns is essential in the formulation of industrial and adjustment policies in light of trade liberalization. The report recommends passive industrial adjustment policies focussed on the U.S., a reflection of the concern of the commissioners for the short term and the U.S.A. The implementation of the report's recommendations would lead to a centralization of economic power at the nationallevel, hence the need to establish a renewed senate to favour the formulation of regionally sensitive national policies.
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A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.
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UANL
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Philippe Robert, Juriste français et sociologue du droit
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Jacques Commaille, Directeur, GAPP (Groupe d’analyse des politiques publiques), Professeur, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Département de Sciences Sociales
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Rapport de recherche
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Rapport de recherche
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Rapport de recherche
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UANL