EU Social Policy: Developments in the field and insights for the study of social policy. ACES Cases No. 2012.1

This paper focuses on the key features of EU social policy and the way it has been interpreted and seeks to identify new directions for study. EU social policy is considered along two main dimensions: its content and hallmark features and the main approaches to conceptualizing and theorizing it. Rather than the classic negative depiction of EU social policy, this piece suggests that it is more significant than usually allowed, not least because the empirical and theoretical lenses which have been applied to it were developed for other purposes. The implication is that developments in EU social policy are often overlooked, not least in how the EU has carved out a role for itself by constantly framing and reframing discourses relevant to social policy and social problems in an attempt to both influence how social actors at all levels of governance approach policy and secure their acceptance of its role in social policy. Therefore analyzing EU social policy outside of the traditional frames reveals interesting and significant developments especially around innovation in social policy and the attempt to legitimate the EU as a social policy actor.

Does the growth in higher education mean a decline in the quality of degrees? CEPS Working Document No. 405/March 2015

In this paper the authors construct a theory about how the expansion of higher education could be associated with several factors that indicate a decline in the quality of degrees. They assume that the expansion of tertiary education takes place through three channels, and show how these channels are likely to reduce average study time, lower academic requirements and average wages, and inflate grades. First, universities have an incentive to increase their student body through public and private funding schemes beyond a level at which they can keep their academic requirements high. Second, due to skill-biased technological change, employers have an incentive to recruit staff with a higher education degree. Third, students have an incentive to acquire a college degree due to employers’ preferences for such qualifications; the university application procedures; and through the growing social value placed on education. The authors develop a parsimonious dynamic model in which a student, a college and an employer repeatedly make decisions about requirement levels, performance and wage levels. Their model shows that if i) universities have the incentive to decrease entrance requirements, ii) employers are more likely to employ staff with a higher education degree and iii) all types of students enrol in colleges, the final grade will not necessarily induce weaker students to study more to catch up with more able students. In order to re-establish a quality-guarantee mechanism, entrance requirements should be set at a higher level.