Rational speculative bubbles: an empirical investigation of the London Stock Exchange

In recent years, a sharp divergence of London Stock Exchange equity prices from dividends has been noted. In this paper, we examine whether this divergence can be explained by reference to the existence of a speculative bubble. Three different empirical methodologies are used: variance bounds tests, bubble specification tests, and cointegration tests based on both ex post and ex ante data. We find that, stock prices diverged significantly from their fundamental values during the late 1990's, and that this divergence has all the characteristics of a bubble.

A model for exchange rates with crawling bands: an application to the Colombian peso

This paper builds upon previous research on currency bands, and provides a model for the Colombian peso. Stochastic differential equations are combined with information related to the Colombian currency band to estimate competing models of the behaviour of the Colombian peso within the limits of the currency band. The resulting moments of the density function for the simulated returns describe adequately most of the characteristics of the sample returns data. The factor included to account for the intra-marginal intervention performed to drive the rate towards the Central Parity accounts only for 6.5% of the daily change, which supports the argument that intervention, if performed by the Central Bank, it is not directed to push the currency towards the limits. Moreover, the credibility of the Colombian Central Bank, Banco de la República’s ability to defend the band seems low.

Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.