When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.

Fiscal Policy and Learning

Using the standard real business cycle model with lump-sum taxes, we analyze the impact of fiscal policy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations (RE). The output multipliers for government purchases are significantly higher under learning, and fall within empirical bounds reported in the literature (in sharp contrast to the implausibly low values under RE). Effectiveness of fiscal policy is demonstrated during times of economic stress like the recent Great Recession. Finally it is shown how learning can lead to dynamics empirically documented during episodes of 'fiscal consolidations.'

Baysian Model Averaging, Learning and Model Selection

Agents have two forecasting models, one consistent with the unique rational expectations equilibrium, another that assumes a time-varying parameter structure. When agents use Bayesian updating to choose between models in a self-referential system, we find that learning dynamics lead to selection of one of the two models. However, there are parameter regions for which the non-rational forecasting model is selected in the long-run. A key structural parameter governing outcomes measures the degree of expectations feedback in Muth's model of price determination.

Finite Horizon Learning

Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the literature: Eulerequation learning, which assumes that consumption decisions are made to satisfy the one-step-ahead perceived Euler equation; and infinite-horizon learning, in which consumption today is determined optimally from an infinite-horizon optimization problem with given beliefs. In our approach, agents hold a finite forecasting/planning horizon. We find for the Ramsey model that the unique rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable at all horizons. However, transitional dynamics can differ significantly depending upon the horizon.

Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation

We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in a Ramsey economy where agents form long-horizon expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the existing framework by introducing distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which makes agents. decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behaviour that can be interpreted as self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism emerging from systematic forecast errors. Moreover, we demonstrate that these waves can have important implications for the welfare consequences of .scal reforms. (JEL: E32, E62, D84)

Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, and Global Learning

What's the role of unilateral measures in global climate change mitigation in a post-Durban, post 2012 global policy regime? We argue that under conditions of preference heterogeneity, unilateral emissions mitigation at a subnational level may exist even when a nation is unwilling to commit to emission cuts. As the fraction of individuals unilaterally cutting emissions in a global strongly connected network of countries evolves over time, learning the costs of cutting emissions can result in the adoption of such activities globally and we establish that this will indeed happen under certain assumptions. We analyze the features of a policy proposal that could accelerate convergence to a low carbon world in the presence of global learning.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Benzodiazepine receptor ligand influences on learning: an endogenous modulatory mechanism mediated by benzodiazepines possibly of alimentary origin

In rats pre-but not post-training ip administration of either flumazenil, a central benzodiazepine (BSD) receptor antagonist, or of n-butyl-B-carboline-carboxylate (BCCB), an inverse agonist, enhanced retention of inhibitory avoidance learning. Flumazenil vlocked the enhancing effect of BCCB, and the inhibitory effect of the BZD agonists clonazepam and diazepam also given pre-training. Post-training administration of these drugs had no effects. The peripheral BZD receptor agonist/chloride channel blocker Ro5-4864 had no effect on the inhibitory avoidance task when given ip prior to training, buth it caused enhancement when given immediately post-training either ip or icv. This effect was blocked by PK11195, a competitive antagonist of Ro5-4864. These results suggest that ther is an endogenous mechanism mediated by BZD agonists, which is sensitive to inverse agonists and that normally down-regulates the formation of memories through a mechanism involving GABA-A receptors and the corresponding chloride channels. The most likely agonists for the endogenous mechanism suggested are the diazepam-like BZDs found in brain whose origin is possibly alimentary. Levels of these BZDs in the cortex were found to sharply decrease after inhibitory acoidance training or mere exposure to the training apparatus.

Learning to live together: an exploration and analysis of managing cultural diversity in ten early childhood development centres in South Africa

This study explores how South African Early Childhood Development (ECD) Practitioners and families meet the needs of the increasing number of children from diverse cultural backgrounds in their care. Research participants were identified through ten ECD centres located in two urban communities in the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces of South Africa. The values and attitudes held by Practitioners and families vis-à-vis cultural diversity was investigated, along with the knowledge and strategies they employ to manage cultural diversity in ECD programmes. The intercultural education model provides the necessary tools to address the challenges identified.

A Survey of Active Learning Algorithms for Supervised Remote Sensing Image Classification

Defining an efficient training set is one of the most delicate phases for the success of remote sensing image classification routines. The complexity of the problem, the limited temporal and financial resources, as well as the high intraclass variance can make an algorithm fail if it is trained with a suboptimal dataset. Active learning aims at building efficient training sets by iteratively improving the model performance through sampling. A user-defined heuristic ranks the unlabeled pixels according to a function of the uncertainty of their class membership and then the user is asked to provide labels for the most uncertain pixels. This paper reviews and tests the main families of active learning algorithms: committee, large margin, and posterior probability-based. For each of them, the most recent advances in the remote sensing community are discussed and some heuristics are detailed and tested. Several challenging remote sensing scenarios are considered, including very high spatial resolution and hyperspectral image classification. Finally, guidelines for choosing the good architecture are provided for new and/or unexperienced user.

Desarrollo de un sistema de e-Learning para Nintendo DS

El proyecto trata de crear un software que dinámicamente nos proporcione exámenes o pruebas dependiendo de nuestro nivel de conocimientos actual. Estos exámenes se cargarán a través de un fichero XML configurable, lo que nos permitirá poner a prueba nuestros conocimientos en el tema que deseemos. El software se desarrollará en Nintendo DS, para aprovechar las prestaciones que nos ofrece de serie: doble pantalla, pantalla táctil, portabilidad.

The Role of model uncertainty and learning in the U.S. postwar policy response to oil prices

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a framework that explicitly accounts for policymakers' uncertainty about the channels of transmission of oil prices into the economy. More specfically, I examine the robust response to the real price of oil that US monetary authorities would have been recommended to implement in the period 1970 2009; had they used the approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2005b) to incorporate model uncertainty and learning into policy decisions. In this context, I investigate the extent to which regulator' changing beliefs over different models of the economy play a role in the policy selection process. The main conclusion of this work is that, in the specific environment under analysis, one of the underlying models dominates the optimal interest rate response to oil prices. This result persists even when alternative assumptions on the model's priors change the pattern of the relative posterior probabilities, and can thus be attributed to the presence of model uncertainty itself.