The current state, problems and future of Germany's air and missile defence. OSW Commentary No. 105, 2013-04-10

From German point of view, air and missile defence systems are of little relevance for the protection of Germany’s territory. However, they are seen as important for conducting ‘out of area’ operations, providing military assistance to allies, and for Germany’s political and military- technical position within NATO. The Bundeswehr has been modernising its air and missile defence systems for several years. The modernisation of very short-range and short-range systems is slightly behind schedule. Plans to modernise the medium-range air and missile defence have been encountering problems since the United States decided to refrain from buying the jointly developed MEADS system. Therefore Germany is currently considering using the results of the MEADS program in the development of its own medium-range air and missile defence system, possibly in co-operation with France and Italy. Such a system would ensure protection against short-range ballistic missiles (up to 1000 km) and might become part of NATO’s ballistic missile defence, replacing the Patriot batteries which Germany is currently operating. Furthermore, Germany could expand its involvement in NATO’s ballistic missile defence in the future by buying or developing system to intercept medium- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles (up to 3000 km and 5500 km). The final decision on this matter has not yet been taken, and will be left for the successive governments of Germany to resolve. It will depend on a number of political, military and financial factors.

Lukashenka has to choose: reforms or concessions to Russia. OSW Commentary No. 42, 2010-10-27

The most serious crisis in the history of Russian-Belarusian relations has been taking place over the past few months. In 2007 Russia started the process of depriving Belarus of subsidies in the form of supplies of fuels at low prices, which have for more than a decade guaranteed the stability of the Belarusian economic model, and is continuing this process now at an accelerated rate. At the same time, the Russian media started attacks on Alyaksandr Lukashenka from the middle of this year. This toughening up of Russia’s measures indicates that the Kremlin is determined to implement its goals regarding Belarus, including first of all taking over its strategic economic assets, which would result in a significant weakening of Lukashenka’s position. The Belarusian government has been consistently avoiding meeting Russian demands, while at the same time insisting on the reinstatement of preferential conditions of co-operation. If the Belarusian leader continues resisting Russian demands, the crisis in Russian- -Belarusian relations will be aggravated, and a conflict over energy issues around the turn of 2011 cannot be ruled out. The reduction in preferences offered by Russia in the energy sector has significantly impaired the condition of the Belarusian economy, and may lead to its breakdown in a year or two. As his country comes under increasing pressure from Russia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka will soon have to make a strategic choice between yielding to the Kremlin’s demands and embarking upon an at least partial restructuring of the economy.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

Cyprus presidency and Turkey's relations with the European Union. OSW Commentary No. 82, 2012-06-26

Turkey’s intention to boycott Cyprus presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2012 is a logical consequence of Ankara’s policy of not recognising the Republic of Cyprus. The boycott will have a negative but limited impact on Turkey-EU relations, and will not in practice significantly affect their intensity in the second half-year. The so-called positive agenda, a new co-operation mechanism between the EU and Turkey, offers a provisional way for the two sides to circumvent the formal obstacle for mutual contacts created by the Cyprus conflict. In itself, however, the launch of the positive agenda is not a breakthrough for Turkey’s integration with the EU. Any such breakthrough is unlikely to occur until progress is made in regulating the Cyprus conflict, and some member states change their attitude towards Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

The Schengen Governance Package-another missed opportunity?. IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/1, February 2015

The Schengen Area of free movement is considered to be one of the most substantial and, in the eyes of many, most successful achievements of European integration. In 2014, the ‘Schengen Governance Package’, which alters the rules of the Schengen co-operation, came into force. It is a response to conflict among Member States in maintaining the common zone of freedom of movement. This Policy Brief aims to analyse how this package was developed and to assess whether it represents a suitable response to the conflict and difficulties within the Schengen agreement. The Brief argues that the Governance Package only touches on one part of the problem, namely border controls, whereas it does not deal with solidarity and burden-sharing and hence represents another missed opportunity to improve cooperation in the Schengen Area.

The OSCE marks 40 years since the Helsinki Final Act: Its principles are more valid than ever. CEPS Essay No. 19, 24 July 2015

Forty years after world leaders from Vancouver to Vladivostok signed up to the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act, in this CEPS Essay Erwan Fouéré considers the historic significance of the agreement that laid the foundations for today’s Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The author concludes with a number of recommendations that recall the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and argues that, if participating states are willing to uphold them, these principles have even greater relevance today for the resolution of Europe’s complex and protracted conflicts.

Controlled ‘Europeanisation’? The KMW–Nexter merger and the Germany’s new strategy for the arms industry. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 180/26.08.2015

On 29 July a deal was signed in Paris concerning a merger between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery systems, and its French counterpart Nexter. The new holding formed as a result of the merger will be Europe’s largest producer of arms systems for land forces, comparable to the Airbus Group in the aerospace industry. While work on finalising the merger was underway, the German government was developing a new strategy for Germany’s arms industry, which was published on 9 June 2015. The strategy’s provisions show that German politicians, despite holding negative opinions on previous mergers between German arms companies and foreign businesses, have concluded that consolidation at the European level is nonetheless the only way to go. However, the strategy also states that the German government should exercise more influence than previously on the terms and conditions of any such consolidation. To this end, it identified key national technologies which will be supported and protected through various instruments, including also the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on strategic defence co-operation. Such agreements may regulate questions such as the ownership structures of the new companies, the locations for developing technologies and for manufacturing products, subcontractors and exports of jointly developed arms and military equipment. In relation to the KMW–Nexter merger, such a deal between France and Germany is expected to be signed this autumn.

The Schengen governance package - another missed opportunity? IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/1 February 2015

The Schengen Area of free movement is considered to be one of the most substantial and, in the eyes of many, most successful achievements of European integration. In 2014, the ‘Schengen Governance Package’, which alters the rules of the Schengen co-operation, came into force. It is a response to conflict among Member States in maintaining the common zone of freedom of movement. This Policy Brief aims to analyse how this package was developed and to assess whether it represents a suitable response to the conflict and difficulties within the Schengen agreement. The Brief argues that the Governance Package only touches on one part of the problem, namely border controls, whereas it does not deal with solidarity and burden-sharing and hence represents another missed opportunity to improve cooperation in the Schengen Area.

Strangers among us. Non-governmental organisations in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY 2015-09-29

The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and destroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and the worsening economic crisis. The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structures for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of channels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.

How to reconcile the EU border paradox? The concurrence of refugee reception and deterrence. IES Policy Brief 2015/4, November 2015

The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe in the summer of 2015 questions the effectiveness of European border and refugee policies. The breakdown of the Dublin and Schengen rules due to chaotic situations at the borders in the Balkans marks a critical juncture for the EU. We consider this breakdown as a consequence of a long-lasting co-operation crisis among EU Member States. The most recent Council decision responds to this co-operation crisis (Council Decision 12098/15). This Policy Brief analyses EU policy and politics and argues that plans for refugee relocation and reception centres as well as the use of qualified majority voting in the Council can unfold a dynamic that helps to solve the co-operation crisis. However, underlying the problems of co-operation and effectiveness is the EU’s border paradox: while EU border policy works towards refugee deterrence, EU asylum policy aims at refugee protection. The EU’s approach in regulating borders and asylum can be understood in terms of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 1993). Reconciling the paradox calls for overcoming such hypocrisy.

Nagorno-Karabakh and the arc of crises on Europe's borders. EPC Policy Brief, 3 February 2016

For more than two decades, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been locked in a stalemate over the Nagorno-Karabakh. The protracted conflict remains the biggest impediment to security, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus. The EU has put itself on the sidelines of the conflict resolution process, allowing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group (MG), of which Russia, France and the US are co-chairs, to take centre stage. In this Policy Brief, Amanda Paul and Dennis Sammut argue that the EU should play a more active role in the conflict resolution process, taking the lead with innovative initiatives and using its soft power skills and experience. A recent review of the European Neighbourhood Policy recognises that protracted conflicts continue to hamper development in the region. This new approach now needs to be given substance, before the conflict further escalates and becomes another crisis on Europe’s border the already burdened Union cannot cope with.

My enemy’s enemy–Turkey’s stance on Islamic State. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 198/24.02.2016

In the context of the civil war in Syria, Turkey has been accused of intense co-operation with Islamic State. The accusations have been coming for some time from the West, and also from the Turkish opposition and the Kurds. The Russian government has also joined in the accusations over the past few months.

Who Benefits from a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement? Policy Brief #2013/04

From a purely economic standpoint, the US and the entire EU will profit from a dismantling of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between both regions. The real gross domestic product per capita would increase in the US and in all 27 EU member countries. Also when one looks at labor markets, the positive effects on employment predominate: Two million additional jobs could be created in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) zone over the long run. The public welfare gains of these economies admittedly do stand in contrast with real losses in income and employment in the rest of the world. On balance, however, the beneficial effects on economic welfare prevail.