Equal Security: Europe and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1968-1976

SALT threatened to institutionalize a bipolar world order. NWS and NNWS alike feared that the US and SU will prioritize global security principles such as systemic stability and conflict stability to Atlantic and European security. Endangered was Europe’s security and position in the future world order. Parity in strategic weapons invalidated the US nuclear umbrella. An ABM deployment and a non-transfer regime threatened Europe’s nuclear defence options. The danger of a Limited War or a denuclearization of Central Europe led to a European co-ordination on nuclear arms control to assure the preservation of the West and the future of Europe.

Congressional acquiescence to presidentialism in the US ‘War on Terror’

Congressional dominance theory holds that not only can the US Congress control the executive, it does. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the Bush administration's ensuing global 'war on terror' suggest a different result. Bush's response to 9/11 signalled not only new directions in US foreign and domestic policy but a new stage in the aggrandisement of presidential power in the United States and a further step in the marginalisation of the Congress. Informed by a constitutional doctrine unknown to the framers of the US Constitution, the Bush administration pursued a presidentialist or 'ultra-separationist' governing strategy that was disrespectful to the legislature's intended role in the separated system. Using its unilateral powers, in public and in secret, claiming 'inherent' authority from the Constitution, and exploiting the public's fear of a further terrorist attack and of endangering the lives of US troops abroad, the administration skilfully drove its legislation through the Congress. Occasionally, the Congress was able to extract concessions - notably in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when partisan control of the government was split - but more typically, for most of the period, the Congress acquiesced to administration demands, albeit with the consolation of minor concessions. The administration not only dominated the lawmaking process, it also cowed legislators into legitimating often highly controversial (and sometimes illegal) administration-determined definitions of counter-terrorism and national security policy. Certainly, the Congress undertook a considerable amount of oversight during the period of the 'war on terror'; lawmakers also complained. But the effects on policy were marginal. This finding held true for periods of Democratic as well as Republican majorities.

The resilience of democratic institutions in Britain, Australia and the United States under conditions of total war

To what extent are democratic institutions resilient when nation states mobilise for war? Normative and empirical political theorists have long argued that wars strengthen the executive and threaten constitutional politics. In modern democracies, national assemblies are supposed to hold the executive to account by demanding explanations for events and policies; and by scrutinising, reviewing and, if necessary, revising legislative proposals intended to be binding on the host society or policies that have been implemented already. This article examines the extent to which the British and Australian parliaments and the United States Congress held their wartime executives to account during World War II. The research finds that under conditions approaching those of total war, these democratic institutions not only continued to exist, but also proved to be resilient in representing public concerns and holding their executives to account, however imperfectly and notwithstanding delegating huge powers. In consequence, executives—more so British and Australian ministers than President Roosevelt—were required to be placatory as institutional and political tensions within national assemblies and between assemblies and executives continued, and assemblies often asserted themselves. In short, even under the most onerous wartime conditions, democratic politics mattered and democratic institutions were resilient.

Towards sustainable peace : peace-building and human security

Failed and fragile states that result from intrastate war pose severe threats to the security of both the international system and individual states alike. In the post-Cold War era, the international community has come to recognize the reality of these threats and the difficulty involved in ending violence and building sustainable peace in failed and fragile states. This work focuses upon the development of a comprehensive strategy for sustainable peace-building by incorporating the tenets of the human security doctrine into the peace-building process. Through the use of case studies of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and East Timor, the development and refinement of the doctrine of human security will occur, as well as, an understanding of how and where human security fits into the sustainable peace-building equation. The end result of the analysis is the development of a hierarchical pyramid formation that brings together human security and peace-building into one framework that ultimately creates the foundation and structure of sustainable peace-building. With the development of a sustainable peace-building structure based upon the human security doctrine, the role of Canada in the support of sustainable peace-building is analyzed in relation to the form and level of involvement that Canada undertakes and contributes to in the implementation and support of sustainable peace-building initiatives. Following from this, recommendations are provided regarding what role(s) Canada should undertake in the sustainable peace-building process that take into consideration the present and likely future capabilities of Canada to be involved in various aspects of the peace-building process. ii This paper outlines the need for a peace-building strategy that is designed to be sustainable in order that failed and fragile states resulting from intrastate conflict do not regress or collapse back into a condition of civil war, and subsequently designs such a strategy. The linking of peace-building and human security creates the required framework from which sustainable peace-building is derived. Creating sustainable peace is necessary in order to increase the likelihood that both present and future generations existing in failed and fragile states will be spared from the scourge of intrastate war.

Decoding the canada's foreing and security policy: tracking the strategic and ethicliberal approaches of a middle power's behavior

The article attempts to explain the main paradox faced by Canada at formulating its foreign policy on international security. Explained in economic and political terms, this paradox consists in the contradiction between the Canadian ability to achieve its strategic goals, serving to its own national interest and its dependence on the United States. The first section outlines three representative examples to evaluate this paradox: the Canada’s position in North American security regime, the US-Canada economic security relations, and the universe of possibilities for action of Canada as a middle power. The second section suggests that liberal agenda, especially concerning to ethical issues, has been established by this country to minimize this paradox. By pursing this agenda, Canada is able to reaffirm its national identity and therefore its independence on the United States. The third section evaluates both the explained paradox and the reaffirmation of Canadian identity during the Jean Chrétien (1993-2003), Paul Martin (2003-2006) and Stephen Harper’s (2006) governments.

MI(R,)G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-42

The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.