La política comercial de Estados Unidos en el marco de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Discurso vs. comportamiento con relación a prácticas anticompetitivas

El objetivo principal de esta monografía es identificar cuáles son las razones que justifican las contradicciones entre el discurso y el comportamiento de Estados Unidos en el marco de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, particularmente con relación a prácticas anticompetitivas derivadas del programa de protección a la agricultura del país. Para ello se analizan el interés nacional y los elementos de la seguridad nacional a partir de los cuales éste se ha construido. También se evalúan los procesos de formulación de política comercial y las interacciones entre los representantes políticos, las asociaciones de productores y el sector privado para mostrar como este comportamiento contradictorio corresponde a la legitimización de un interés particular.

¿Complicamos demasiado las cosas en los contratos financieros internacionales? (Tema Central)

Este es un momento de gran agitación dentro de los mercados de crédito. Durante los últimos seis meses, decenas de billones de dólares de inversiones en papeles o instrumentos de deuda han tenido que ser castigados. Poderosas instituciones financieras han caído. Algunas de ellas se han visto obligadas a vender importantes porciones de su participación accionarial a inversionistas no convencionales con el fin de mantener los porcentajes mínimos de capital requerido.

Conceptualización del riesgo en los mercados financieros (Tema Central)

El riesgo está inmerso en todas las actividades humanas y es entendido como la probabilidad de ocurrencia de un evento que deviene en un perjuicio. Por ende al hablar de riesgo en materia financiera, nos referimos a una eventual pérdida de dinero que signifique, de manera directa, una afectación al sistema financiero o a una de las instituciones que lo conforman. Con lo antedicho, el presente trabajo consiste en una recopilación de información de algunos de los riegos inmersos en los mercados financieros. Con ello, la exposición de riesgos como los de mercado, operacional, de liquidez, legal, reputacional, entre otros, resulta fundamental. Finalmente hemos optado por presentar, en breves rasgos, algunos de los riesgos de crédito y métodos válidos para su adecuada valoración.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in the Eurozone and the European Union. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

Countercyclical regulation in Solvency II: merits and flaws. CEPS Commentary, 25 June 2012

October 2011 saw the latest draft of Solvency II, the European Union’s code for regulation of the insurance industry. This commentary, a collective effort by a group of academics specializing in financial, banking and insurance institutions, argues that the latest proposals need to be drafted again, urgently.

Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 22 June 2012

This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, and was the result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. We argue that this can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria. We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became increasingly worried about this in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries.

An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks.

Implementing Basel III in Europe: disgnosis and avenues for improvement. CEPS Policy Brief No. 275, 27 June 2012

This Policy Brief provides a preliminary diagnosis of the proposed regulatory reforms contained in the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV-CRR), which translate into EU law the Basel III standards adopted by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, and suggests avenues for improvement. The main criticism is that the proposal is not ambitious enough. In some crucial areas, such as the leverage ratio and the long-term liquidity requirements adopted under the Basel III framework, the CRD IV-CRR proposal stops short of making a strict commitment to introduce binding requirements and instead is contented with weaker (and possibly divergent) disclosure requirements.

Why an ESM programme could be a kiss of death: Recovery values and subordination. CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2012

Spain, needing a bailout for its banks, was granted a vague promise by EZ leaders for up to €100 billion. The details remain obscure, yet they matter enormously. This column argues that the so-called ‘subordination effect’ of fresh official lending could put Spain on the slippery road to ruin. It argues that if sovereign bonds must be bought, this should be done in the secondary market which, would be on an equal footing with private investors and thus avoid the subordination trap.

Eurozone as home country of banks. CEPS Commentary, 2 July 2012

The euro area summit has managed to surprise the markets once again. By moving banking supervision of the eurozone to the European Central Bank, a huge step towards a more federal banking model has been taken, explains CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. But will this move be enough to re-establish confidence, bolster the euro interbank market and further financial integration?

Path to eurobonds. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/10, July 2012

This paper discusses proposals for common euro area sovereign securities. Such instruments can potentially serve two functions: in the short-term, stabilize financialmarkets and banks and, in the medium-term, help improve the euro area economic governance framework through enhanced fiscal discipline and risk-sharing. Many questions remain onwhether financial instruments can ever accomplish such goals without bold institutional and political decisions, and,whether, in the absence of such decisions, they can create new distortions. The proposals discussed are also not necessarily competing substitutes; rather, they can be complements to be sequenced along alternative paths that possibly culminate in a fully-fledged Eurobond. The specific path chosen by policymakers should allow for learning and secure the necessary evolution of institutional infrastructures and political safeguards.