Extent and limitations of density functional theory in describing magnetic systems

The performance of density-functional theory to solve the exact, nonrelativistic, many-electron problem for magnetic systems has been explored in a new implementation imposing space and spin symmetry constraints, as in ab initio wave function theory. Calculations on selected systems representative of organic diradicals, molecular magnets and antiferromagnetic solids carried out with and without these constraints lead to contradictory results, which provide numerical illustration on this usually obviated problem. It is concluded that the present exchange-correlation functionals provide reasonable numerical results although for the wrong physical reasons, thus evidencing the need for continued search for more accurate expressions.

Conditional manipulation of sex ratios by ant workers: A test of kin selection theory

Variable queen mating frequencies provide a unique opportunity to study the resolution of worker-queen conflict over sex ratio in social Hymenoptera, because the conflict is maximal in colonies headed by a singly mated queen and is weak or nonexistent in colonies headed by a multiply mated queen. In the wood ant Formica exsecta, workers in colonies with a singly mated queen, but not those in colonies with a multiply mated queen, altered the sex ratio of queen-laid eggs by eliminating males to preferentially raise queens. By this conditional response to queen mating frequency, workers enhance their inclusive fitness.

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Instrumental leadership: An extension of the Full-Range Leadership Theory

From a theoretical perspective, an extension to the Full Range leadership Theory (FRLT) seems needed. In this paper, we explain why instrumental leadership--a class of leadership includes leader behaviors focusing on task and strategic aspects that are neither values nor exchange oriented--can fulfill this extension. Instrument leadership is composed of four factors: environmental monitoring, strategy formulation and implementation, path-goal facilitation and outcome monitoring; these aspects of leadership are currently not included in any of the FRLT's nine leadership scales (as measured by the MLQ--Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire). We present results from two empirical studies using very large samples from a wide array of countries (N > 3,000) to examine the factorial, discriminant and criterion-related validity of the instrumental leadership scales. We find support for a four-factor instrumental leadership model, which explains incremental variance in leader outcomes in over and above transactional and transformational leadership.

P value and the theory of hypothesis testing: an explanation for new researchers.

In the 1920s, Ronald Fisher developed the theory behind the p value and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed the theory of hypothesis testing. These distinct theories have provided researchers important quantitative tools to confirm or refute their hypotheses. The p value is the probability to obtain an effect equal to or more extreme than the one observed presuming the null hypothesis of no effect is true; it gives researchers a measure of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. As commonly used, investigators will select a threshold p value below which they will reject the null hypothesis. The theory of hypothesis testing allows researchers to reject a null hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis of some effect. As commonly used, investigators choose Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and Type II error (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) levels and determine some critical region. If the test statistic falls into that critical region, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Despite similarities between the two, the p value and the theory of hypothesis testing are different theories that often are misunderstood and confused, leading researchers to improper conclusions. Perhaps the most common misconception is to consider the p value as the probability that the null hypothesis is true rather than the probability of obtaining the difference observed, or one that is more extreme, considering the null is true. Another concern is the risk that an important proportion of statistically significant results are falsely significant. Researchers should have a minimum understanding of these two theories so that they are better able to plan, conduct, interpret, and report scientific experiments.

Reception of Walras' theory of exchange and theory of production in Russia

This paper evaluates the reception of Léon Walras' ideas in Russia before 1920. Despite an unfavourable institutional context, Walras was read by Russian economists. On the one hand, Bortkiewicz and Winiarski, who lived outside Russia and had the opportunity to meet and correspond with Walras, were first class readers and very good ambassadors for Walras' ideas, while on the other, the economists living in Russia were more selective in their readings. They restricted themselves to Walras' Elements of Pure Economics, in particular, its theory of exchange, while ignoring its theory of production. We introduce a cultural argument to explain their selective reading. JEL classification numbers: B 13, B 19.