807 resultados para Extremal Problems
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Now 40, Colby’s Environmental Studies Program is growing exponentially, equipping students to tackle real-world problems.
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The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.
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We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.
Resumo:
We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.
Resumo:
This article starts by analysing healthcare litigation in Brazil by means of a literature review of articles that contribute with empirical findings on this phenomenon. Based on this review, I argue that health care litigation in Brazil makes the public health system less fair and rational. In the second part of this article, I discuss the three most overarching responses to control the level of litigation and its impact on the public health system: (i) the public hearing held by the Supreme Federal Court and the criteria the court established thereafter; (ii) the recommendations by the National Council of Justice aimed at building courts’ institutional capacity; and (iii) the enactment of the Federal Law 12.401/11, which created a new health technology assessment system. I argue that latter is the best response because it keeps the substantive decisions on the allocation of healthcare resources in the institution that is in the best position to make them. Moreover, this legislation will make the decisions about provision of health treatments more explicit, making easier for courts to control the procedure and the reasons for these decisions.