1000 resultados para Experimental diabetics
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We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.
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O autor mostra que o Telenomus fariai Lima, microhimenópetero parasito endófago, pode, experimentalmente, desenvolver-se em ovos de Triatoma maculata, T. brasiliensis, T. vitticeps e T. rubrovaria. Faz considerações sôbre a observação dos ovos parasitados, ciclo evolutivo, número de microhimenópteros saídos por ovo e proporção entre os sexos do Telenomus fariai.
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Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.
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Com o fim de produzir o fenômeno de KOCH, os A. A. inocularam em 30 leprosos da Colônia Mirueira (Recife), de várias idades e formas clínicas, emulsões vivas de três culturas de bacilos ácido-álcool resistentes isolados de leprosos pro um dêles (S.A.). As doses inoculadas foram de 0,2 cc., por via intradérmica, em cada doente, das amostras "CII", "E" e "H" e mais da Leprolina S.A. (antígeno morto). No 10º dia da inoculação verificou-se que 24 dos 30 pacientes tiveram reação geral intensa; 2, reação moderada e 4, nenhuma reação geral. 16 dos 30 tiveram reação leprótica, sendo 10 em casos ativos (lepromatosos) e 6 em inativos, e 17 dos 30 tiveram adenopatias inguinais. O inóculo "CII" produziu escaras de 1 x 1 e 2 x 2 cm. de diâmetro, com destruição total da pele, nos 30 pacientes (o total dêles); o inóculo "E" produziu escaras de igual intensidade em 29, o inóculo "H", escaras muitos mais benignas em 23, e a Leprolina em 10, naturalmente por ação concomitante de um dos outros três inóculos. No 10º dia foram semeadas em meio de LOEWENSTEIN secreções das escaras de sete dos 30 doentes, num total de 20 tubos, dos quais 19 produziram retroculuras, a amioria contaminada por fungos ou por bactérias cianófilas. De um doente foi obtido retrocultura cromogênica da escara produzida na intradérmoreação pela "Leprolina S. A.", macro e microscòpricamente indiferencável das amostras "CII" e "E". Aliás, pela extensiva experimentação feita com estas duas amostras, estamos nos inclinando por considerá-las como idênticas. No 18º dia da inoculação foram feitos 30 esfregaços de secreções de lesões experimentais de 13 doentes, com 15 resultados positivos (50%), apesar do exame tardio. As morfologias macro e microscópica das retroculturas obtidas em Recife confirmam os caracteres descritos nas culturas originais. Dêste rápido ensaio se conclui que a maioria dos pacientes apresentou o fenômeno de KOCH parcial ou integral, com as clássicas reações gerais, focais e locais. A falta de recursos de laboratório na Colônia não permitiu melhor aproveitamento de tão precioso material experimental, e por isso êste trabalho apresenta várias lacunas.
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Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj
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While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.
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The A. described on December 14, 1951, his first culture of acid-fast bacillus isolated from nasal mucus of a leprous girl. in this paper the A. describes two new strains of acid-fast bacilli gotten also from nasal mucus of other two leprous girls, L3 cases. The first patient (layse S) had her mucus treated by petroff's method on December 16, 1952 and sown onto three tubes of loewenstein medium and in glycerin broth. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all three tubes of Loewenstein showed many punctiforme and pin-head yellowish colonies, whose microscopic examination proved to be of a pure acid-fast bacillus culture. This sample inoculated in rats and mice produced, after 55 days incubation, small tumors from which the culture was easily recovered. On April, 9, 1953 a new sample of nasal mucus of the same patient was sown in three tubes of Loewenstein. After two weeks incubation at 37°C all 3 tubes showed germination of small yellowish colonies of acid-fast bacilli. Within four months being gotten two samples of identical cultures in all smeared tubes of Loewenstein medium sown, proved that such cultures were not an ordinary ambient contamination. Second patient: - Maria N. After various sowing of different kinds of material from her, february 26, 1953 her nasal mucus treated by soda and sown onto Loewenstein medium, after 25 days incubation showed in only one tube, one small round colony, at first white, becoming creamy after three months. Transplants in various media grew at first slowly and after 2 or 3 generations grew faster. The "Layse" strain produced pellicle in glycerin broth and Dubos medium; the "Maria N." strain did not produce as yet. Both strains (Layse I and II, and Maria N.) gave weak positive Dubos test in half-an-hour and negative after 24 hours reading. Both were strongly positive when stained by Gram, Ziehl-Neelsen and Fontes methods. Both strains gave also positive fluoroscopy. These cultures are being studied. The A. concludes that, according to his experience, the slower growing cultures of acid-fast bacilli isolated from leprosy material, are the more suitable for experimental work. Aknowledgement. The A. thanks to Miss MARIA DE LOURDES SANTANA for her valuable collaboration in the studies of the described cultures.
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It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.
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When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.
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We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.
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We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.
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Aquest treball de recerca presenta les diferents fases d’un experiment pilot que vaig projectar i realitzar dins l’àmbit de l’ensenyament de la traducció a un context universitari. L’experiment va consistir en l’aplicació i observació d’una metodologia didàctica innovadora, amb una base epistemològica socioconstructivista i humanista, i en l’avaluació dels resultats obtinguts. Per l’experiment pilot vaig seleccionar com a marc teòric el model socioconstructivista del procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge proposat per Williams i Burden (1997), que integra instàncies constructivistes, interaccionistes i humanistes. En aquest àmbit vaig elaborar una metodologia didàctica innovadora, el “Taller de Traducció”, modelat sobre el Constructivist Workshop proposat per Don Kiraly (2000: 62-64) al qual vaig aportar algunes modificacions per adequar-lo al context diferent d’ensenyament. El disseny experimental basat en la utilització d’un grup experimental i d’un de control, preveu el recurs a instruments de recollida de dades qualitatives i quantitatives. Les hipòtesis elaborades prospecten l’aparició de determinats efectes com a conseqüència de l’aplicació del tractament experimental (autonomia, motivació i presa de consciència) i, al mateix temps es basen en la pressuposició, sustentat sobre la literatura consultada, que els efectes prospectats milloren el procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge. Per tant, vaig intentar, per una banda, verificar l’eficàcia del tractament relacionada amb l’aparició dels efectes prospectats i, per una altra, mesurar l’incidència d’aquests efectes sobre el procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge. A més, vaig dur a terme l’observació i avaluació de la metodologia aplicada respecte la coherència amb les bases epistemològiques socioconstructivistes i a la funcionalitat dins el context universitari on es va aplicar. Totes les dades recollides confirmen la coherència i la funcionalitat de la metodologia aplicada, tant pel que fa a l’eficàcia relacionada amb l’aparició dels efectes prospectats a les hipòtesis elaborades i a la seva incidència sobre la millora del procés d’ensenyament i aprenentatge, tot i que es van detectar algunes fallides a l’experiment pilot que se solucionaran a l’experiment definitiu. Els resultats positius de l’experiment pilot han estat confirmades també per les dades d’altres dos experiments realitzats posteriorment amb altres grups d’estudiants de la mateixa assignatura. Tots els resultats recollits es faran servir per projectar l’experiment definitiu, aportant-hi les modificacions necessàries per eliminar les fallides evidenciades durant la fase d’aplicació de l’experiment pilot i de les seves extensions i seguiments, i serviran com a base per a la meva tesi doctoral a la qual voldria arribar a formular una proposta socioconstrucitivista i humanista integradora per a l’ensenyament de la traducció.