Research intensity and knowledge transfer activity in UK universities

As the innovation process has become more open and networked, Government policy in the UK has sought to promote both research excellence in the university sector and the translation of this into economic benefit through university–business engagement. However, this policy approach has tended to be applied uniformly with little account for organisational differences within the sector. In this paper we consider if differences between universities in their research performance is reflected in their knowledge transfer activity. Specifically, as universities develop a commercialization agenda are the strategic priorities for knowledge transfer, the organisational supports in place to facilitate knowledge transfer and the scale and scope of knowledge transfer activity different for high research intensive (HRI) and low research intensive (LRI) universities? The findings demonstrate that universities’ approach to knowledge transfer is shaped by institutional and organisational resources, in particular their ethos and research quality, rather than the capability to undertake knowledge transfer through a Technology Transfer Office (TTO). Strategic priorities for knowledge transfer are reflected in activity, in terms of the dominance of specific knowledge transfer channels, the partners with which universities engage and the geography of business engagement.

Suez 1956: A European Intervention

This article does not analyse events in the Middle East. It is concerned with the structural background of the Suez Crisis. The Cold War bargain of 1949-50, and thus the Western bloc architecture, was challenged in 1956 and 1962-63. The Suez Crisis and the SKYBOLT Affair are classic examples of intra-bloc conflict. This article focuses on inter-allied conflict during the Suez Crisis. The crisis year 1956 witnessed a European challenge to the bipolar order of the Cold War. It is the hypothesis of this article that the mystique of the Suez Crisis unravels, if the events are interpreted as a clash of conflicting world views. The article attempts to enhance our understanding of the crisis by exploring the impact of the formation of a European core on the transatlantic pluralistic security community. The article will thus re-evaluate the architectural debate within the Western partial system. It is the aim to shed new light on the almost unexplored European foreign-policy co-operation within the Western European Union (WEU) in the crisis year 1956