Organised Criminals as 'Agents of Obligation': The Case of Ireland

Relying on Brown’s (2005a, b) thesis that contemporary shifts in penal policy are best understood as a reprisal of colonial rationality, so that offenders become ‘non-citizens’ or ‘agents of obligation’, this article argues that this framework finds support in developments in Irish criminal justice policy. Recent legislation aimed at offenders suspected of involvement in ‘organised crime’ is examined through this lens. These offenders have found themselves reconstituted as ‘agents of obligation’ with duties to furnish information about their property and movements, report to the police concerning their location and, importantly, refrain from criminal activity or face extraordinary sanctions. It is therefore argued that this paradigm is a useful heuristic device through which to understand recent developments in Irish criminal justice and elsewhere. In light of the trends observed in Ireland, certain refinements and extensions to Brown’s argument are put forward for consideration.

“Local politics and global corporate crime in Irish crime fiction : Alan Glynn's Winterland trilogy",

Crime, Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal Context

Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, is considered to enshrine an absolute right. Yet it contains an under-explored element: inhuman and degrading punishment. While torture has been the subject of extensive academic commentary, and inhuman and degrading treatment has been examined to some extent, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment has not been explored in significant depth, in spite of its considerable potential to alter the penal landscape.

This paper elucidates the key doctrinal elements of inhuman and degrading punishment ‘and treatment associated with it’, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It addresses a number of ‘puzzles’ or problems which arise in applying the absolute right enshrined in Article 3 of the ECHR to sentencing and imprisonment, clarifies ECtHR doctrine and highlights some of its key implications. Bringing a theoretically informed understanding to bear on the application of Article 3 of the ECHR in a penal context, the paper provides clarity and coherence to a complex and crucial intersection between human rights and penology.