Antibiotic prophylaxis for urinary tract infections after removal of urinary catheter: meta-analysis

Abstract Objective To determine whether antibiotic prophylaxis at the time of removal of a urinary catheter reduces the risk of subsequent symptomatic urinary tract infection. Design Systematic review and meta-analysis of studies published before November 2012 identified through PubMed, Embase, Scopus, and the Cochrane Library; conference abstracts for 2006-12 were also reviewed. Inclusion criteria Studies were included if they examined antibiotic prophylaxis administered to prevent symptomatic urinary tract infection after removal of a short term (≤14 days) urinary catheter. Results Seven controlled studies had symptomatic urinary tract infection after catheter removal as an endpoint; six were randomized controlled trials (five published; one in abstract form) and one was a non-randomized controlled intervention study. Five of these seven studies were in surgical patients. Studies were heterogeneous in the type and duration of antimicrobial prophylaxis and the period of observation. Overall, antibiotic prophylaxis was associated with benefit to the patient, with an absolute reduction in risk of urinary tract infection of 5.8% between intervention and control groups. The risk ratio was 0.45 (95% confidence interval 0.28 to 0.72). The number needed to treat to prevent one urinary tract infection was 17 (12 to 30). Conclusions Patients admitted to hospital who undergo short term urinary catheterization might benefit from antimicrobial prophylaxis when the catheter is removed as they experience fewer subsequent urinary tract infections. Potential disadvantages of more widespread antimicrobial prophylaxis (side effects and cost of antibiotics, development of antimicrobial resistance) might be mitigated by the identification of which patients are most likely to benefit from this approach.

Cost and power analysis of linkage disequilibrium methods for locating genes influencing quantitative traits in humans

Linkage disequilibrium methods can be used to find genes influencing quantitative trait variation in humans. Linkage disequilibrium methods can require smaller sample sizes than linkage equilibrium methods, such as the variance component approach to find loci with a specific effect size. The increase in power is at the expense of requiring more markers to be typed to scan the entire genome. This thesis compares different linkage disequilibrium methods to determine which factors influence the power to detect disequilibrium. The costs of disequilibrium and equilibrium tests were compared to determine whether the savings in phenotyping costs when using disequilibrium methods outweigh the additional genotyping costs.^ Nine linkage disequilibrium tests were examined by simulation. Five tests involve selecting isolated unrelated individuals while four involved the selection of parent child trios (TDT). All nine tests were found to be able to identify disequilibrium with the correct significance level in Hardy-Weinberg populations. Increasing linked genetic variance and trait allele frequency were found to increase the power to detect disequilibrium, while increasing the number of generations and distance between marker and trait loci decreased the power to detect disequilibrium. Discordant sampling was used for several of the tests. It was found that the more stringent the sampling, the greater the power to detect disequilibrium in a sample of given size. The power to detect disequilibrium was not affected by the presence of polygenic effects.^ When the trait locus had more than two trait alleles, the power of the tests maximized to less than one. For the simulation methods used here, when there were more than two-trait alleles there was a probability equal to 1-heterozygosity of the marker locus that both trait alleles were in disequilibrium with the same marker allele, resulting in the marker being uninformative for disequilibrium.^ The five tests using isolated unrelated individuals were found to have excess error rates when there was disequilibrium due to population admixture. Increased error rates also resulted from increased unlinked major gene effects, discordant trait allele frequency, and increased disequilibrium. Polygenic effects did not affect the error rates. The TDT, Transmission Disequilibrium Test, based tests were not liable to any increase in error rates.^ For all sample ascertainment costs, for recent mutations ($<$100 generations) linkage disequilibrium tests were less expensive than the variance component test to carry out. Candidate gene scans saved even more money. The use of recently admixed populations also decreased the cost of performing a linkage disequilibrium test. ^

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

A New Economic Analysis of the American Revolution

We offer an analysis of the American Revolution in which actors are modeled as choosing the sovereign organization that maximizes their net expected benefits. Benefits of secession derive from satisfaction of greed and settlement of grievance. Costs derive from the cost of civil war and lost benefit of Empire membership. When expected net benefits are positive for both secessionists and the Empire civil war ensues, otherwise it is settled or never begins in the first place. The novelty of our discussion is to show how diverse economic and non-economic factors (such as pamphleteering by Thomas Paine and the morale of the Revolutionary forces) can be integrated into a single economic model.

Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis

This paper develops a general theory of land inheritance rules. We distinguish between two classes of rules: those that allow a testator discretion in disposing of his land (like a best-qualified rule), and those that constrain his choice (like primogeniture). The primary benefit of the latter is to prevent rent seeking by heirs, but the cost is that testators cannot make use of information about the relative abilities of his heirs to manage the land. We also account for the impact of scale economies in land use. We conclude by offering some empirical tests of the model using a cross-cultural sample of societies.

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.

Are Indian Firms too Small? A Nonparametric Analysis of Cost Efficiency and Industry Structure of Indian Manufacturing

In this paper we use the 2004-05 Annual Survey of Industries data to estimate the levels of cost efficiency of Indian manufacturing firms in the various states and also get state level measures of industrial organization (IO) efficiency. The empirical results show the presence of considerable cost inefficiency in a majority of the states. Further, we also find that, on average, Indian firms are too small. Consolidating them to attain the optimal scale would further enhance efficiency and lower average cost.

Health care policy analysis of Medicaid's early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) benefit in Colorado

The purpose of this thesis is to identify "best practice" recommendations for successful implementation of the EPSDT outreach program at Memorial Health System's Hospital for Children in Colorado Springs through a policy analysis of Medicaid EPSDT services in Colorado. A successful program at Memorial will increase education and awareness of EPSDT services, enrollment, and access to and utilization of health care services for eligible children. Methodology utilized in this study included questionnaires designed for the EPSDT contract administrator and outreach coordinators/workers; analysis of current federal and state policies; and studies conducted at the federal and state level, and by various advocacy groups. The need for this analysis of EPSDT came about in part through an awareness of increasingly high numbers of children in poverty and who are uninsured. Though the percentage of children living in poverty in Colorado is slightly below the national average (see Table 2), according to data analyzed by The Annie E. Casey Foundation, the percentage of children (0-18) living in poverty in Colorado increased from 10% in 2000 to 16% in 2006, a dramatic increase of 60% surpassed by only one other state in the nation (The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2008). By comparison, the U.S. percentage of children in poverty during the same time frame rose from 17% to 18% (The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2008). What kind of health care services are available to this vulnerable and growing group of Coloradans, and what are the barriers that affect their enrollment in, access to and utilization of these health care services? Barriers identified included difficulty with the application process; system and process issues; a lack of providers; and a lack of awareness and knowledge of EPSDT. Fiscal restraints and legislation at the federal and state level are also barriers to increasing enrollment and access to services. Outreach services are a critical component of providing EPSDT services, and there were several recommendations regarding outreach and case management that will benefit the program in the future. Through this analysis and identification of a broad range of barriers, a clearer picture emerged of current challenges within the EPSDT program as well as a broad range of strategies and recommendations to address these challenges. Through increased education and advocacy for EPSDT and the services it encompasses; stronger collaboration and cooperation between all groups involved, including providing a Medical Home for all eligible children; and new legislation putting more money and focus on comprehensive health care for low-income uninsured children; enrollment, access to and utilization of developmentally appropriate and quality health care services can be achieved. ^

Cost analysis of opt-in consent procedures for the Texas statewide immunization information system, ImmTrac

Background. Childhood immunization programs have dramatically reduced the morbidity and mortality associated with vaccine-preventable diseases. Proper documentation of immunizations that have been administered is essential to prevent duplicate immunization of children. To help improve documentation, immunization information systems (IISs) have been developed. IISs are comprehensive repositories of immunization information for children residing within a geographic region. The two models for participation in an IIS are voluntary inclusion, or "opt-in," and voluntary exclusion, or "opt-out." In an opt-in system, consent must be obtained for each participant, conversely, in an opt-out IIS, all children are included unless procedures to exclude the child are completed. Consent requirements for participation vary by state; the Texas IIS, ImmTrac, is an opt-in system.^ Objectives. The specific objectives are to: (1) Evaluate the variance among the time and costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (2) Estimate the total costs associated with collecting ImmTrac consent at selected public and private birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area; (3) Describe the alternative opt-out process for collecting ImmTrac consent at birth and discuss the associated cost savings relative to an opt-in system.^ Methods. Existing time-motion studies (n=281) conducted between October, 2006 and August, 2007 at 8 birthing hospitals in the Greater Houston area were used to assess the time and costs associated with obtaining ImmTrac consent at birth. All data analyzed are deidentified and contain no personal information. Variations in time and costs at each location were assessed and total costs per child and costs per year were estimated. The cost of an alternative opt-out system was also calculated.^ Results. The median time required by birth registrars to complete consent procedures varied from 72-285 seconds per child. The annual costs associated with obtaining consent for 388,285 newborns in ImmTrac's opt-in consent process were estimated at $702,000. The corresponding costs of the proposed opt-out system were estimated to total $194,000 per year. ^ Conclusions. Substantial variation in the time and costs associated with completion of ImmTrac consent procedures were observed. Changing to an opt-out system for participation could represent significant cost savings. ^

A low cost and widely applicable methodology of digital imagen analysis of ores for mineral and envirommental engineering

Technological and environmental problems related to ore processing are a serious limitation for sustainable development of mineral resources, particularly for countries / companies rich in ores, but with little access to sophisticated technology, e.g. in Latin America. Digital image analysis (DIA) can provide a simple, unexpensive and broadly applicable methodology to assess these problems, but this methodology has to be carefully defined, to produce reproducible and relevant information.