Economic growth with bubbles

We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, changes in investorsentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes.We show how these bubbles mitigate the effects of financial frictions. During bubbly episodes,unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfersof resources improve the efficiency at which the economy operates, expanding consumption, thecapital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, these transfers stop and consumption, thecapital stock and output contract. We characterize the stochastic equilibria of the model and arguethat they provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Managerial incentives for mergers

We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimalcontract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under bothquantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previousliterature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rivalfirms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take overmore rivals than would be profitable.

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Unmet Needs SFY 2004 Final Report, February 2005

Despite the successes of the Senior Living Program and other efforts of the Iowa Aging Network, there continue to be documented unmet needs throughout the state, in part because of general fund budget reductions. These are needs identified for elderly Iowans that the community service networks are unable to meet. The sources for this data are interdisciplinary teams with the Case Management Program for the Frail Elderly (CMPFE) and service providers under contract with the Area Agencies on Aging.

Unmet Needs SFY 2005 Final Report Version 2 10/26/2005

Despite the successes of the Senior Living Program and other efforts of the Iowa Aging Network, there continue to be documented unmet needs throughout the state, in part because of general fund budget reductions. These are needs identified for elderly Iowans that the community service networks are unable to meet. The sources for this data are interdisciplinary teams with the Case Management Program for the Frail Elderly (CMPFE) and service providers under contract with the Area Agencies on Aging.

Unmet Needs SFY 2006 Final Report, October 2006

Despite the successes of the Senior Living Program and other efforts of the Iowa Aging Network, there continue to be documented unmet needs throughout the state, in part because of general fund budget reductions. These are needs identified for elderly Iowans that the community service networks are unable to meet. The sources for this data are interdisciplinary teams with the Case Management Program for the Frail Elderly (CMPFE) and service providers under contract with the Area Agencies on Aging.

Unmet Needs SFY 2007 Final Report, October 2007

Despite the successes of the Senior Living Program and other efforts of the Iowa Aging Network, there continue to be documented unmet needs throughout the state, in part because of general fund budget reductions. These are needs identified for elderly Iowans that the community service networks are unable to meet. The sources for this data are interdisciplinary teams with the Case Management Program for the Frail Elderly (CMPFE) and service providers under contract with the Area Agencies on Aging.

Unmet Needs Report, July 2006-June 2007

Despite the successes of the Senior Living Program and other efforts of the Iowa Aging Network, there continue to be documented unmet needs throughout the state, in part because of general fund budget reductions. These are needs identified for elderly Iowans that the community service networks are unable to meet. The sources for this data are interdisciplinary teams with the Case Management Program for the Frail Elderly (CMPFE) and service providers under contract with the Area Agencies on Aging. June 2007 Unmet Needs Report May 2007 Unmet Needs Report April 2007 Unmet Needs Report March 2007 Unmet Needs Report February 2007 Unmet Needs Report January 2007 Unmet Needs Report December 2006 Unmet Needs Report November 2006 Unmet Needs Report October 2006 Unmet Needs Report September 2006 Unmet Needs Report August 2006 Unmet Needs Report July 2006 Unmet Needs Report

Bubbly collateral and economic activity

This paper develops a model of the bubbly economy and uses it to study the effects of bailoutpolicies. In the bubbly economy, weak enforcement institutions do not allow firms to pledge futurerevenues to their creditors. As a result, "fundamental" collateral is scarce and this impairs the intermediationprocess that transforms savings into capital. To overcome this shortage of "fundamental"collateral, the bubbly economy creates "bubbly" collateral. This additional collateral supports anintricate array of intra- and inter-generational transfers that allow savings to be transformed intocapital and bubbles. Swings in investor sentiment lead to fluctuations in the amount of bubblycollateral, giving rise to bubbly business cycles with very rich and complex dynamics.Bailout policies can affect these dynamics in a variety of ways. Expected bailouts provideadditional collateral and expand investment and the capital stock. Realized bailouts reduce thesupply of funds and contract investment and the capital stock. Thus, bailout policies tend to fosterinvestment and growth in normal times, but to depress investment and growth during crisis periods.We show how to design bailout policies that maximize various policy objectives.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Locação: Critérios de decisão e de reconhecimento

Uma empresa pode alcançar bons resultados, se os gestores da mesma optarem pela melhor fonte de financiamento. Na qualidade de alternativa de financiamento, a locação financeira tem vindo a apresentar níveis de crescimentos bastante expressivas, tendo já sido adoptado por grande parte do tecido empresarial internacional, como meio privilegiado de financiamento de médio e longo prazo. Desta forma, o presente trabalho desenvolve o tema: “ Locação: Critérios de Decisão e de Reconhecimento”, focalizando na locação financeira enquanto alternativa de financiamento. Tendo como objectivo, demonstrar a utilização ou não da locação financeira como meio de financiamento e de apresentar os critérios para fundamentar tal decisão, foi feito um inquérito a algumas empresas no mercado em São Vicente. A apreciação das respostas obtidas e análise do inquérito levou à conclusão de que a locação financeira é uma actividade relativamente recente, sendo pouca explorada pelo tecido empresarial. O trabalho explora ainda uma dimensão contabilística das locações, relacionada com os processos de mensuração e reconhecimento no balanço e nas demonstrações de resultados. Para além disso, este trabalho vai mais adiante com um estudo de caso, utilizando como instrumento um contrato de locação financeira, para averiguar na prática qual o tratamento contabilístico atribuído a este tipo de contrato pelos intervenientes no contrato. O estudo de caso foi feito com base em documentos facultados por uma das empresas inquiridas no mercado em São Vicente, da qual por exigência da mesma garantimos a confidencialidade, utilizando assim um nome fictício “Alfa, S.A.”. Esperamos que este estudo exploratório seja útil e que contribua para o aumento do conhecimento teórico e prático sobre as locações, a todos os interessados nesta matéria. A company can get good results, if their managers, opt for the best financing source. In the quality of financing alternative, the financial lease has been demonstrating, growth levels quite expressive, having already been adopted for great part of the international business fabric, as a privilege way of financing of medium and long period. On this way, the present work develops the theme: “Lease: Criteria of decision and of the recognition” focusing in the financial lease while financing alternative. The goal is to demonstrate the use of the financial lease as a way of financing and of presenting the criteria to base such decision, it was made an inquiry to some companies in São Vicente market. The appreciation of the obtained answers and the analyzes of such inquiry took the conclusion that the financial lease is an activity relatively recent, being little explored by the business fabric. This work explores also a accountant dimension of the related leases with the mensuration processes and of recognition of the swinging and in the demonstration of results. Besides, this work is going further on with a case study, using as instrument a contract of financial lease to inquire in practice which is the accounting treatment attributed to this type of contract by the intervening in the contact. The study case was done with base in documents allowed by one of the companies inquired in São Vicente, of which we guaranteed the confidentiality for demand of the same, using as a fictitious the name “Alfa, S.A.” We hoped that this exploratory study is useful and that it contributes to the increase of the theoretical knowledge and practice on the leases, to all the interested in this matter.

Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.