Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

TUNPOP, a computer simulation model of the yellowfin tuna population and the surface tuna fishery of the Eastern Pacific Ocean

ENGLISH: Mathematical documentation of TUNP0P, an age-structured computer simulation model of the yellowfin tuna population and surface tuna fishery of the eastern Pacific Ocean, is described. Example runs of the model are presented and discussed, and the sensitivity of the model output to changes in various parameters is examined. SPANISH: Se describe la documentación matemática de TUNP0P, un modelo computador de simulación basado en la edad de la población del atún aleta amarilla y de la pesca atunera epipelágíca del Océano Pacífico oriental. Se presentan y se discuten ejemplos de las pasadas del modelo, y se examina la sensibilidad de los resultados de salida con relación a los cambios de varios parámetros. (PDF contains 47 pages.)