A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report-Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2006

A-1 - March 2006 -Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, May 2006

A-1 May 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Sibling rivalry and vocal negotiation in the barn owl Tyto alba

Chez les animaux, les jeunes dépendant des parents durant leur développement sont en compétition pour obtenir la nourriture, qu'ils quémandent par des cris et postures ostentatoires et se disputent physiquement. Les frères et soeurs n'ont pas la même compétitivité, en particulier s'ils diffèrent en âge, et leur niveau de faim fluctue dans le temps. Comme dans tout type de compétition, chacun doit ajuster son investissement aux rivaux, c'est à dire aux besoins et comportements de ses frères et soeurs. Dans le contexte de la famille, selon la théorie de sélection de parentèle, les jeunes bénéficient de leur survie mutuelle et donc de la propagation de la part de gènes qu'ils ont en commun. L'hypothèse de la « négociation frères-soeurs » prédit que, sous certaines conditions, les jeunes négocient entre eux la nourriture, ce qui réduit les coûts de compétition et permet de favoriser les frères et soeurs les plus affamés. La littérature actuelle se focalise sur les signaux de quémande entre enfants et parents et les interactions compétitives frères-soeurs sont étudiées principalement au sein de paires, alors que les nichées ou portées en comprennent souvent de nombreux. Cette thèse vise à mieux comprendre comment et jusqu'à quel point plusieurs jeunes ajustent mutuellement leurs signaux de besoin. C'est une question importante, étant donné que cela influence la répartition de nourriture entre eux, donc la résolution du conflit qui les oppose et à terme leur valeur évolutive. Le modèle d'étude est la chouette effraie (Tyto alba), chez laquelle jusqu'à neufs poussins émettent des milliers de cris chacun par nuit. Ils négocieraient entre eux la prochaine proie indivisible rapportée au nid avant que les parents ne reviennent : un poussin affamé crie plus qu'un autre moins affamé, ce qui dissuade ce dernier de crier en retour et par la suite de quémander la nourriture aux parents. L'investissement optimal correspondrait donc à écarter son frère en permanence vu que l'arrivée des parents est imprévisible, mais à moindre coût. Dans un premier axe, nous avons exploré au sein de dyades les mécanismes acoustiques permettant aux poussins de doser leur effort vocal durant les heures de compétition où ils sont laissés seuls au nid. Nous avons trouvé que les poussins évitent de crier simultanément, ce qui optimiserait la discrimination du nombre et de la durée de leurs cris, lesquels reflètent de façon honnête leur niveau de faim et donc leur motivation. L'alternance des cris paraît particulièrement adaptée au fait que les poussins se fient à des variations temporelles subtiles dans le rythme et la durée de leurs vocalisations pour prendre la parole. En particulier, allonger ses cris tout en criant moins dissuade efficacement le rival de répondre, ce qui permet de monopoliser la parole dans de longs « monologues ». Ces règles seraient universelles puisqu'elles ne dépendent pas de la séniorité, de la faim, ni de la parenté et les poussins répondent à un playback de façon similaire à un vrai frère. Tous ces résultats apportent la première preuve expérimentale que les juvéniles communiquent de façon honnête sur leurs besoins, ajustent activement le rythme de leurs cris et utilisent des composantes multiples de leurs vocalisations d'une façon qui réduit le coût de la compétition. De plus, il s'agit de la première démonstration que des règles de conversation régissent de longs échanges vocaux chez les animaux de façon comparable aux règles basiques observées chez l'Homme. Dans un second axe, nous avons exploré les stratégies comportementales que les poussins adoptent pour rivaliser avec plusieurs frères et soeurs, par le biais d'expériences de playback. Nous avons trouvé que les poussins mémorisent des asymétries de compétitivité entre deux individus qui dialoguent et répondent plus agressivement au moins compétitif une fois qu'ils sont confrontés à chacun isolément. Dans la même ligne, quand ils entendent un nombre variable d'individus criant à un taux variable, les poussins investissent le plus contre des rivaux moins nombreux et moins motivés. En accord avec les prédictions des modèles théoriques, les poussins de chouette effraie escaladent donc les conflits pour lesquels leur chance de gagner contrebalance le plus l'énergie dépensée. Nous révélons ainsi que 1) les jeunes frères et soeurs 'espionnent' les interactions de leurs rivaux pour évaluer leur compétitivité relative, ce qui est sans doute moins coûteux qu'une confrontation directe avec chacun, et 2) dosent leur investissement vocal en fonction du nombre de rivaux actuellement en compétition et de leur motivation de façon concomitante. Ces résultats montrent que les interactions entre frères et soeurs au nid reposent sur des mécanismes similaires à ceux observés, mais encore de façon anecdotique, chez les adultes non apparentés qui se disputent les territoires et partenaires sexuels. Cette thèse souligne donc combien il est crucial de considérer dorénavant la famille comme un réseau de communication à part entière pour mieux comprendre comment les jeunes résolvent les conflits autour du partage des ressources parentales. Plus généralement, elle révèle l'importance de la dynamique temporelle des vocalisations dans les conflits et la communication des animaux. A la lumière de nos résultats, la chouette effraie apparaît comme un modèle clé pour de futures recherches sur la résolution des conflits et la communication acoustique. - In species with parental care, offspring contest priority access to food by begging through conspicuous postures and vocalisations and by physically jockeying. Siblings differ in their competitiveness, especially in the case of age and size hierarchies, and their hunger level fluctuates in time. As in competition in general, each individual should adjust its investment to opponents that is to say to its siblings' needs and behaviours. In the particular context of family, according to kin selection theory, siblings derive extra fitness benefits from their mutual survival and hence the spreading of the genes they share. The "sibling negotiation" predicts that, under certain conditions, young would negotiate among them priority access to food, which reduces competition costs and enables promoting the most hungry siblings. To date, the literature focuses on signals of need between parents and offspring and competitive interactions (in particular among siblings) are mostly studied within pairwise interactions, yet they commonly involve more numerous rivals. This PhD aims at better understanding how and the extent to which several young siblings compete through signalling. This is important since this influences how food is allocated among them, thus the outcome of sibling rivalry and ultimately their fitness. I use the barn owl (Tyto alba) as a model, in which the one to nine nestlings emit a simple noisy call thousands of times per night. Thereby, they would negotiate among them priority access to the indivisible food next delivered prior to parents' feeding visits. A hungry nestling emits more calls than a less hungry sibling, which deters it to call in return and ultimately beg food at parents. The optimal investment thus corresponds to constantly deterring the rival to compete, given that parents' arrival is unpredictable, but at the lowest costs. In the first axis of my thesis, we explored within dyads the acoustic mechanisms by which owlets dose vocal effort when competing during the hours they are left alone. We found that owlets avoid overlapping each other's calls. This would enhance the discrimination of both call number and duration, which honestly reflect individuals' hunger level and hence motivation to compete. Such antiphony seems best adapted to the fact that siblings actually use subtle temporal variations in the rhythm and duration of their calls to take or give their turn. Owlets alternate monologs, in which lengthening calls efficiently deters the rival to respond while reducing call number. Such rules depend neither on seniority, hunger level nor kinship since nestlings responded similarly to a live sibling and an unrelated playback individual. Taken together, these findings provide the first experimental proof that dependent young honestly communicate about their need, actively adjust the timing of their calls and use multicomponent signals in a way that reduces vocal costs. Moreover, this is the first demonstration of conversational rules underlying animal long-lasting vocal exchanges comparable to the basic turn-taking signals observed in humans. In the second axis, we focused on the behavioural strategies owlets adopt to compete with more than one sibling, using playback experiments. We found that singleton bystanders memorised competitive asymmetries between two playback individuals dialoguing and responded more aggressively to the submissive one once they later faced each of both alone. Moreover, when hearing a varying number of nestlings calling at varying rates, owlets vocally invested the most towards fewer and less motivated rivals. In line with predictions from models on conflict settlement, barn owls thus escalate contests in which their chance of winning best counterbalances the energy spent. These results reveal that young socially eavesdrop on their siblings' interactions to assess their relative competitiveness at likely lower costs than direct confrontation, and dose vocal effort relative to both their number and motivation. This shows that young siblings' interactions imply mechanisms similar to those observed, yet still anecdotally, in unrelated adults that contest mates and territories. This PhD therefore highlights how crucial it is to further consider family as a communication network to better understand how siblings resolve conflicts over the share of parental resources. More generally, it provides important insights into the role of the temporal dynamics of signalling during animal contests and communication. In the light of our findings, the barn owl emerges as a key model for future research on conflict resolution and acoustic communication in animals.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program, June 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program - June 2006

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2006

A-1 July 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Economies of Feedlot Scale, Biosecurity, Investment, and Endemic Livestock Disease, September 2006

Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program August 2006

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

Academic Building Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report