G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, May 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - May 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Report on the Early Out Incentive (EOI) programs, including a Buy Out Program, for the period November 20, 2001 through February 28, 2006

Report on the Early Out Incentive (EOI) programs, including a Buy Out Program, for the period November 20, 2001 through February 28, 2006

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, June 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, June 2007

On the cultural transmission of corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmissionof values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully.

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, August 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - August 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, September 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs - September 2007

G-1 Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, July 2007

G-1 - Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs