Research on Ultimate Loading Carrying Capacities in Concrete Bridge Deck Slabs with Consideration of Compressive Membrane Action

In the investigation of real loading capacities in concrete bridge deck slabs,the study of this type of structure was carried out with consideration of compressive membrane action.A series of experimental test of steel-concrete bridge structures was developed with the analysis of influences from the varying of structural parameters on loading capacities,including reinforcement percentages,supporting beam sizes and concrete compressive strength.Through the study of the experimental results,it was found that the real structural loading capacities are larger than those predicted by current design methods.Therefore,based on the previous research,a prediction method for loading capacities of concrete bridge deck slabs was established with consideration of CMA,which was built based on the plastic ultimate analysis.In this method,the lateral restraint stiffness subjected by concrete bridge deck slabs was provided.The proposed theoretical model is capable of predicting the loading capacities of this type of structure accurately with comparison of results from several bridge deck experimental tests.

Multiply reconfigurable ‘plug and play’ molecular logic via self-assembly

A substantial set of ion-driven molecular logic gates are implemented in turn by arranging the association between easily available lumophores and receptors in detergent micelles.

Reducing the mapping between perception and action facilitates imitation

This study investigated two hypotheses regarding the mapping of perception to action during imitation. The first hypothesis predicted that as children’s cognitive capacities increase the tendency to map one goal and disregard others during imitation should decrease. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the performances of 168 4- to 7-year-olds in a gestural imitation task developed by Bekkering, Wohlschläger, and Gattis. The second hypothesis predicted that reducing the mapping between perception and action should reduce the demands on the cognitive resources of the child. This hypothesis was tested by creating a condition in which perception and action overlapped by sharing objects between experimenter and child. In three experimental conditions, an adult modelled four gestures, directed at either: 1) one of two sets of round stickers (proprietary objects); 2) the same location on the table, without any sticker (no objects); or 3) one set of round stickers, which were shared with the child (shared objects). The results confirmed both hypotheses. Four- and five-year-olds imitated less accurately when imitation involved mapping of both objects and movements (proprietary and shared objects) than when imitation involved mapping movements only (no objects). Seven-year-olds imitated accurately in all three conditions, demonstrating that increased cognitive capacity allowed them to map multiple goals from perception to action. Most importantly, reducing the mapping between perception and action in the shared objects condition facilitated imitation, specifically for the transitional group, 6-year-olds. We conclude that mapping between perception and action is not direct, but resembles mapping relations in analogical reasoning: cognitive processes mediate mapping from perception to action.

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.