Earnings management and audit adjustments: An empirical study of IBEX 35 constituents

Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.

Teaching, research and service: Experience and opinions of accounting Spanish academics

Research, teaching and service are the main activities carried out in almost all European universities. Previous research, which has been mainlycentred in North-American universities, has found solid results indicatingthat research and teaching are not equally valued when deciding on facultypromotion. This conclusion creates a potential conflict for accountingacademics on how to distribute working time in order to accomplish personalcareer objectives. This paper presents the results of a survey realisedin two European countries: Spain and the United Kingdom, which intendedto explore the opinions and personal experience of accounting academicsworking in these countries. Specifically, we focus on the following issues:(i) The impact of teaching and service on time available for research;(ii) The integration of teaching and research; (iii) The perceived valueof teaching and research for career success and (iv) The interaction betweenprofessional accounting and accounting research. The results show thatboth in Spain and in the United Kingdom there is a conflict between teachingand research, which has its origin in the importance attached to researchactivities on promotion decisions. It also seems evident that so far, theconflict is being solved in favour of research in prejudice of teaching.

Creative accounting: Some ethical issues of macro- and micro-manipulation

This paper examines two principal categories of manipulative behaviour. The term'macro-manipulation' is used to describe the lobbying of regulators to persuadethem to produce regulation that is more favourable to the interests of preparers.'Micro-manipulation' describes the management of accounting figures to produce abiased view at the entity level. Both categories of manipulation can be viewed asattempts at creativity by financial statement preparers. The paper analyses twocases of manipulation which are considered in an ethical context. The paperconcludes that the manipulations described in it can be regarded as morallyreprehensible. They are not fair to users, they involve an unjust exercise ofpower, and they tend to weaken the authority of accounting regulators.

The struggle against creative accounting: Is "true and fair view" part of the problem or part of the solution?

Creative accounting is a growing issue of interest in Spain. In this article we argue that the concept true and fair view can limit or promote the use of creative accounting depending upon its interpretation. We review the range of meanings that true and fair view can take at an international level and compare the experience of the United Kingdom with the Australian one by analysing the use of true and fair view to limit creative accounting. Finally, we suggest lines of action to be considered by the Spanish accounting standards-setting institutions.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.