Gestão estratégica no Poder Legislativo: o caso da Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de Minas Gerais

O objetivo do artigo é registrar, criticamente, o processo de implantação da gestão estratégica na Assembleia Legislativa de Minas Gerais, com o propósito de revelar seusantecedentes e motivações; os momentos-chave; as facilidades e dificuldades; os resultados alcançados e os desafios futuros. A abordagem escolhida foi a histórico-descritiva e as ações de pesquisa envolveram revisão bibliográfica, pesquisa documental e entrevistas semiestruturadas. As conclusões apontam que a implantação da gestão estratégica na Assembleia Legislativa de Minas Gerais é um processo complexo e multifacetado, diante de suas características de órgão público, hierarquizado, com alta divisão de trabalho. O avanço da implantação é lento, devido aos fatores dificultadores apontados. O caso traz elementos relevantes para a pesquisa sobre gestão estratégica no setor público, seja por apresentar o processo de forma analítica e confrontada com a teoria, seja por se tratar especificamente de um órgão do Poder Legislativo

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.