A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report-Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2006

A-1 - March 2006 -Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, May 2006

A-1 May 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Organizational Choice and Environmental Change

We explain the choice between franchising and vertical integration by estimating a model of relative performance in a sample of 250 Spanish car distributors, controlling for self-selection and including environmental factors. The method allows us to estimate performance counterfactuals. Organizational choice seemingly aims to contain moral hazard for both distributors and manufacturers but it is subject to start-up constraints and switching costs. While the market for franchises remained underdeveloped, information asymmetries led to the opening of integrated outlets. Their subsequent conversion into franchised outlets probably involved prohibitive transaction costs. Consequently, they performed worse than would have been expected had they been independent, as confirmed by the systematic improvement observed when they were in fact converted. The timing of such conversions suggests that switching costs were prohibitive until firms developed a substantial cushion of temporary contracts, previously forbidden by regulation.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program, June 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program - June 2006

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2006

A-1 July 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Economies of Feedlot Scale, Biosecurity, Investment, and Endemic Livestock Disease, September 2006

Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program August 2006

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report: Family Investment Program, September 2006

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report: Family Investment Program produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2002

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program