Evaluation of the State Highway System and Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF), 2003

This report was prepared by a committee of city, county and state representatives. The committee met throughout 2002 with the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations to improve the efficiency and operation of Iowa's road and street system. This report is referenced in SF 451 and in Code Section 306.8A.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2004

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2004

Monthly report from the Iowa Department of Human Services on Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).

Essays in banking and corporate finance

Abstract This paper presents a model of executive compensation in which the executive is risk-averse and has specific knowledge -knowledge about the optimal actions to take that is costly to transfer to the principal. The model generates predictions that are consistent with the available evidence and provides a rationale for a number of unresolved puzzles in executive compensation. Notably, we find that relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the quality of specific knowledge is low. We also show (1) why some common risk components are not filtered out of executives' pay, (2) why performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements, and (3) why executives with higher perceived abilities are given stronger incentives. Finally, we demonstrate that the relation between risk and incentives may be positive or negative, depending on the quality of the executive's specific knowledge.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2004

Monthly report from the Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2004

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.

Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons

This article aims to explain the difference between the expenditure reported in governmental end-of-the-year budgets and the amounts previously forecasted in the approved beginning-of-the-year budgets. We measure how political, financial, and institutional variables affect this spending drift. We focus on two much-debated factors, namely, tax revenue budgeting errors and the stringency of fiscal rules. Our econometric approach uses a panel based on the 26 Swiss cantons covering the period of 1980 to 2011. Results suggest that stringent fiscal rules discourage budget overruns, whereas underestimating tax revenue-i.e., a budgetary "pleasant surprise"-offers the opportunity for some overspending.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2004

Supplemental Security Income Program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, October 2004

Supplemental Security Income Program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, November 2004

Supplemental Security Income Program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2005

Supplemental security income program

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, December 2004

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM